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another face, they tend to perceive that face as more similar to their own and report 
that it belongs WRWKHP7KLV³HQIDFHPHQWHIIHFW´DSSHDUVWREHDFRPSHOOLQJLOOXVLRQ
and also modulates social cognitive processes. This thesis further examined the effect 
of such synchronous multisensory stimulation on physical and psychological aspects 
of the self. Chapter 2 explored whether multisensory facial stimulation can reduce 
UDFLDO SUHMXGLFH:KLWH REVHUYHUV¶ IDFHVZHUH VWURNHGZLWK D FRWWRQEXGZKLOH WKH\
watched a black face being stroked in synchrony. This was compared with a no-touch 
and an asynchronous stroking condition. Across three experiments, observers 
consistently reported an enfacement illusion after the synchronous condition. 
However, this effect did not produce concurrent changes in implicit or explicit racial 
prejudice. 
Chapter 3 explored whether a similar enfacement effect can be elicited with a 
novel gaze-contingent mirror paradigm. In this paradigm, an onscreen face either 
mimicked REVHUYHUV¶RZQH\H-gaze behaviour (congruent condition), moved its eyes 
LQ GLIIHUHQW GLUHFWLRQV WR REVHUYHUV¶ H\HV (incongruent condition), or remains 
XQUHVSRQVLYH WR WKH REVHUYHUV¶ JD]H QHXWUDO FRQGLWLRQ 2EVHUYHUV H[SHULHQFHG D
consistent enfacement illusion after the congruent condition across two of three 
experiments. However, while the mimicry of the onscreen fDFH DIIHFWHG REVHUYHUV¶
phenomenological experience, it did not alter their perceptual self-representations. 
A final experiment, in Chapter 4, further investigated the cognitive locus of the 
enfacement effect by using ERPs. Observers were exposed to blocks of synchronous 
and asynchronous stimulation. ERPs were then recorded while observers were 
presented with images of (a) a synchronously stimulated face, (b) an asynchronously 
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stimulated face, (c) their own face, (d) one of two unfamiliar filler faces and (e) an 
unfamiliar target face. Observers consistently reported an enfacement illusion after the 
synchronous condition. However, this enfacement effect was not evident in ERP 
components reflecting early perceptual encoding of the face (i.e., N170) or subsequent 
identity- and affect-related markers, such as the N250 and the P300. 
 Altogether the results of this thesis show that it is possible to enface a face, 
even when it belongs to a different ethnic group to that of the observer. This effect is 
such that observers report that the enfaced face belongs to them. Interestingly, a similar 
phenomenological enfacement experience can be obtained with gaze-contingent mirror 
paradigm. However, this enfacement effect seems to be too short-lived to be reflected 
in ERP components. 
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The own face is a distinctive physical feature that has a strong relationship with 
the own identity. This is such that some authors consider the own face as the emblem 
RIWKHVHOI0F1HLOODQGDQµLGHQWLW\ERXQGDU\LVVXH¶7LQJ-Toomey, 1994). The 
own face not only forms the main visual means by which other people recognise us, 
but also the main means by which we recognize ourselves in front of the mirror or in 
recorded footage. Interestingly, this ability to recognize the own face (i.e., self-face 
recognition) has been observed in humans, but also in non-human primates (Chang, 
Fang, Zhang, Poo, & Gong, 2015; Robert, 1986) and other mammals such as elephants 
(Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006) and cetaceans (Reis & Marino, 2001). 
Research has shown that, in terms of identity, the own face has a relevant status 
over other pieces of self-related information such as the name. The reason for this 
might be that the face is a unique and distinctive personal feature, unlike other personal 
information such as names, which could be shared by several individuals (see Devue 
& Brédar, 2011). This relevance of self-face information for the own identity is 
illustrated in some dramatic and unfortunate real scenarios. For example, Robert 
Antelme was a member of the French Resistance. In his book La especie humana 
(Antelme, 1947), Antelme gave an interesting testimony about the time he spent as a 
prisoner in a concentration camp, during the Second World War (see also Fanon, 
1952). In these camps, Nazi soldiers tore apart the identity of the prisoners by 
confiscating their personal belongings and swapping their names for a number. After 
a long time without seeing his own face, an inmate gave Robert Antelme a small mirror 
in which he could see his face. Antelme reported that, during this mirror experience, 
he recovered his sense of identity (Antelme, 1947; Fanon, 1952).  
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Cognitive psychologists have tried to understand what is so relevant about the 
own face. Several lines of research have shown that the self-face is not only relevant 
compared with other pieces of self-LQIRUPDWLRQEXWDOVRFRPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUV¶IDFHV
(see Devue & Brédar, 2011 for review). This is striking as all faces have a very similar 
configuration ² all of them have two eyes above a central nose and mouth. What is 
exclusive about the own face is not its configuration, but the access that it provides to 
two interrelated concepts of the self, namely identity and self-consciousness. 
 
1.2 Identity and self-consciousness  
The definition of identity and self-consciousness has been an important 
question for philosophers and psychologists. Philosophers from Classical Greece (i.e., 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle) and occidental philosophers (i.e., Rene Descartes, John 
Lucke, Immanuel Kant, Ortega y Gasset) already tried to describe and understand the 
nature of identity and consciousness. More recently, with the advent of the 
experimental psychology, psychologists and neuroscientists have studied this topic in 
a more systematic way (see Gallagher, 2000 for review).  
Identity and self-consciousness are related concepts. While identity consists of 
the personality traits, the features and the social relationships that define who one is 
(Oyserman, Elmore, Smith, 2012), self-consciousness makes reference to being aware 
RIZKRRQHLVRULQ0RULQ¶VZRUGVthe capacity to become the object of one´s 
own attention. That is, identity can be considered as pre-requisite of self-
consciousness. The process of self-consciousness involves focusing the attention to 
any feature related to the self, from our physical appearance to more abstract self-
information such as thoughts, values, opinions and intentions. The fact that self-
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consciousness reflects different aspects of self-information shows that it is a 
multifaceted concept (see Ben-Artzi, Mikulincer, & Glaubman, 1995; Zeman, 2001). 
Morin (2006) presents a model of self-consciousness that takes into account 
different types of self-information, which differ in nature and complexity. This model 
of self-awareness is presented in Figure 1 and distinguishes between conceptual or 
private and perceptual or public self-information (for a similar description, see 
Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Conceptual self-information consists on the 
unobservable features and events related with the self, such as intentions, motives, 
values, goals, and emotions. On the contrary, perceptual self-information would be the 
observable aspects of the self, such as our behaviour and physical appearance.  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of conceptual (private) and perceptual (public) self-information (from Morin, 
2006).  
 
According to Morin (2006), one important property of public self-information 
is that it directly affects the conceptual or private self-information. This is such that 
research protocols in the field of comparative psychology use visual self-referential 
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stimuli as a way to investigate self-awareness (e.g., Chang et al., 2015; Plotnik et al., 
2006; Reis & Marino, 2001; Robert, 1986). Moreover, the model proposes that, 
because of its abstract representation, the conceptual aspects represent the highest level 
of self-consciousness (Morin, 2006). Thus, someone who is able to access their own 
values, thoughts or opinions would have a higher level of self-awareness than someone 
who can only access physical features or behaviour. According to Morin (2006), 
visual-self recognition is therefore an important aspect of identity and self-
consciousness because it affects more complex aspects of identity such as intentions, 
motives, values, goals and emotions.  
 
1.3 Is the self-face special?  
The knowledge that people have about their physical features appears to be an 
important aspect of identity and self-consciousness (Morin, 2006). Both the face and 
the body refOHFWRQH¶VSK\VLFDODSSHDUDQFHDQG are useful means by which people can 
recognize us. However, these parts differ in the degree of representativeness of our 
identity. Because of its distinctiveness, people tend to recognize others by their face, 
and not by the body. It is perhaps for this reason that there is more research in the field 
of self-face than self-body recognition (for a review, see Gillihan & Farah, 2005). 
The physical properties of different faces are very similar: all faces have two 
eyes, which are set above a central nose and a mouth (i.e., the so-called first-order 
relations between facial features, see Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). Despite 
this similarity among faces, the experience that people gather with their own face 
seems to be both quantitatively (e.g., Tong & Nakayama, 1999) and qualitatively 
different (e.g., Brédart, 2003; Greenberg & Goshen-Gottstein, 2009) to the experience 
they have with the faces of others. 
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An early study in this field compared the time to detect the own and an 
unfamiliar face among a set of distractor faces, and showed that observers were quicker 
in detecting the former (see Tong & Nakayama, 1999). This advantage for the own 
face suggests that it is strongly represented as a consequence of overlearning. 
However, this study only compared the performance of the own face with unfamiliar 
faces, so it is not clear whether this advantage reflects processing of the own face per 
se or a more general advantage for over-learnt faces, such as those of famous or 
personally familiar people. Using a face naming paradigm, Troje and Kersten (1999) 
compared the time to name frontal and profile versions of highly familiar faces and 
observers¶ own faces. They found that observers were faster to respond to the own face 
in both orientations. These results have been replicated with other paradigms such as 
face matching (Laeng & Rouw, 2001), recognition (e.g., Keenan et al., 1999), and 
orientation identification (e.g., Sui, Zhu, & Han, 2006).  
All of the reviewed studies so far report an advantage for the self-face in terms 
of reactions times. However, this advantage is not as clear in accuracy measures (e.g., 
Brédart & 'HYXH7KRPSVRQ)RUH[DPSOHREVHUYHUV¶DFFXUDF\WRGHWHFW
changes in the interocular distance of faces is similar for personally familiar faces and 
the own face (Brédart & Devue, 2006). This shows that there is a quantitative 
advantage for the self-face compared with both unfamiliar and familiar faces, but only 
in reaction times. 
Overlearning could explain the self-face advantage for the own face (Tong & 
Nakayama, 1999). However, while people might see their own face more often than 
RWKHUV¶ faces, they usually can only do so when a mirror is used. This different 
experience might also affect the way in which we process our own face. In support of 
this reasoning, observers tend to rate mirror-reversed photographs of themselves as 
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more representative than non-reversed photographs (Rhodes, 1985, 1986), but this 
preference is reversed when the close friend of an observer judges the same pictures 
(Mita, Derme, & Knight, 1977). This indicates that people prefer stimuli that they have 
been exposed to: as we tend to see our own faces mostly in mirrors, we prefer mirror-
RULHQWDWLRQSLFWXUHV2QWKHRWKHUKDQGZKHQVHHLQJDIULHQG¶VIDFHWKLVLVSUHIHUUHGLQ
its normal orientation as this is most frequently encountered.  
These differences between the self and others also seem to affect how faces are 
HQFRGHG DW D IHDWXUDO OHYHO$FFRUGLQJ WR *DOWRQ  µD IDFH LV SHUFHLYHGDV DQ
XQGHFRPSRVHG ZKROH¶ UDWKHU WKDQ D FROOHFWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO IHDWXUHV LH KROLVWLF
processing). Some evidence has shown that familiar faces are associated with more 
holistic processing than unfamiliar faces (e.g., Clutterbuck & Johnston, 2005; Jackson 
& Raymond, 2008). In contrast, the own face appears to be processed more at a featural 
level (see Greenberg & Goshen-Gottstein, 2009). This is such that observers are 
quicker to create a holistic mental image of an unfamiliar face than their own face. By 
contrast, they are quicker to create a mental image of a facial feature of their own face 
(e.g. the nose) than of a familiar face (Greenberg & Goshen-Gottstein, 2009). These 
GLIIHUHQFHV PLJKW UHODWH WR WKH IDFW WKDW SHRSOH XVH RWKHUV¶ IDFHV IRU LGHQWLILFDWLRQ
purposes whereas they do not need to identify themselves in a mirror. In contrast, such 
time might be used to inspect individual facial features during activities such as 
JURRPLQJDQGVKDYLQJ7KHUHIRUHWRFUHDWHDPHQWDOLPDJHRIRQH¶VRZQIDFHSHRSOH
might be more likely to process individual facial features (see Greenberg & Goshen-
Gottstein, 2009).  
In summary, research in self-face processing has shown that the own face has 
special properties that create differences in how it is processed in comparison to other 
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familiar and unfamiliar faces. These differences could explain the advantage for self-
face detection and recogniWLRQFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUV¶IDFHV 
 
1.4 Neural markers of self-face processing  
Considering the advantage for processing the self-IDFH FRPSDUHG WR RWKHUV¶
faces, it is possible that this is reflected in neural markers of face processing. The aim 
of this section is, therefore, to review these neural markers.  
 
1.4. 1 Behavioural studies 
Early research found evidence of a right hemispheric dominance in the 
processing of the self-face. For example, observers responded faster to their own face 
compared to the face of a friend or unfamiliar faces, but only when responses were 
made with the left hand (Keenan et al., 1999). Similar results have been found using 
self-other discrimination task (Keenan, Freund, Hamilton, Ganis, & Pascual-Leone, 
2000). In this task, observers see a video VKRZLQJDEOHQGEHWZHHQWKHREVHUYHU¶VIDFH
and a famous face. The video starts with a 0% self-face - that is, by showing exclusively 
the famous face. The blend between the faces increased with time, so that the face 
LPDJHJUDGXDOO\FKDQJHVLQWRWKHREVHUYHU¶VIDFH2EVHUYHUVWKHQKDYHWRSUHVVDNH\
to stop the video when they find that the onscreen face more closely resembles 
themselves than the famous identity. Results showed that observers stopped the video 
sooner when responses were made with the left than the right hand, indicating a right-
hemisphere advantage for the own-face.  
More recent behavioral evidence has also shown an important role of the left 
hemisphere in self-face recognition. For example, when observers are presented with 
two symmetric chimeric faces of their own face (see Figure 2), which are either 
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constructed only from the left side of their face or the right side, they tend to judge the 
latter as more similar to their own face (Brady, Campbell, & Flaherty, 2004). This side 
corresponds with the half face that lies in their right visual field when they look at 
themselves in the mirror. Interestingly, when observers were presented with two 
symmetric chimeric images of a close friend, they showed a bias toward the chimeric 
face that was created from the left side. That is, in this case an advantage is found for 
the side of the face that lies in the left visual field when observers interact face to face 
with their friend (Brady et al., 2004).  
Thus, behavioural studies are inconclusive regarding the hemisphere 
dominance for self-face recognition. However, it is possible that task- or stimulus-
specific factors such as spatial frequency of the stimuli, content and duration affect the 
hemispheric advantage (see Brady et al., 2004; Sergent, 1988). For this reason, future 
studies should control these factors systematically. 
 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of chimeric faces. The left side face is the original face. The central face is 
made only with the left part of the original face. The right side face is made only with the right side of 
the original face. Face Image taken from the Glasgow Face Database (Burton, White & McNeill, 2010). 





1.4.2 Neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric studies  
Further evidence for hemispheric differences in self-face and other-face 
recognition comes from neuropsychological studies with split-brain patients. However, 
these have also yielded mixed results. For example, while early studies showed a right 
hemisphere dominance for the self-face compared to familiar faces (Preilowski, 1977; 
Sperry, Zaidel, & Zaidel, 1979), more recent studies have found a left-hemisphere 
dominance (Turk et al., 2002) or no difference between hemispheres (Uddin, Rayman, 
& Zaidel, 2005). However, Gallois, Ovelacq, Hautecoeur and Dereux (1988) also 
reported the case of a patient with localised damaged in the left occipital lobule, 
including the left fusiform gyrus. This patient presented alexia, agnosia and 
achromatopsia. Although the patient had problems in recognizing her own face, her 
autobiographical memory and her ability to recognize familiar faces were preserved. 
This case report not only shows the involvement of the left hemisphere in self-
recognition but also of a specific brain structure, the left fusiform gyrus.  
However, other disorders, such as mirrored-self misidentifications, again 
appear to provide conflicting evidence. This is a neuropsychiatric disorder that consists 
of WKHEHOLHI WKDWRQH¶VRZQPLUURU LPDJH UHIOHFWVDQRWKHUSHUVRQ (Breen, Caine, & 
Coltheart, 2000, 2001; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Van den Stock, de Gelder, De 
Winter, Van Laere, & Vandenbulcke, 2012). Evidence from this disorder has shown 
right hemisphere dominance in self-face recognition. For example, these patients have 
relatively preserved left hemisphere function, but severe visuoconstructional deficits 
and a poor visual memory, which are evidence of right hemisphere dysfunction (Breen 
et al., 2001). 
In conclusion, although most neuropsychological evidence has showed 
evidence for right-hemisphere dominance in self-face recognition, some studies have 
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shown that specific brain structures in the left hemisphere also play a role in this 
process (Gallois et al., 1988; Turk et al., 2002). At first glance, these results seem 
contradictory, but this discrepancy might, in fact, indicate that both hemispheres play 
an important role in self-face recognition. 
 
1.4.3 Neuroimaging studies 
([FHSW IRU *DOORLV DQG FROOHDJXHV¶ VWXG\ *DOORLV HW DO  DOO RI WKH
reviewed studies so far provide evidence about lateralization in self-face recognition 
but not about specific brain structures. Neuroimaging techniques, such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron emission tomography (PET), explore 
brain activity while observers perform a cognitive task. This allows for the localisation 
of brain structures involved in self-face recognition.  
A PET study found activation of the left fusiform gyrus and the right 
supramarginal gyrus in both passive self-recognition (i.e., observers do not perform 
any action when they see their own face) and active self-recognition (i.e., observers 
press a key when the own face is presented) compared to the presentation of unfamiliar 
faces (Sugiura et al., 2000). A follow-up fMRI study that included familiar faces as a 
control also showed that the left fusiform gyrus, the right occipito-temporo-parietal 
junction and the frontal operculum were selectively activated for the own face (Sugiura 
et al., 2005). 
Devue et al. (2007) compared the brain activation for the own face with the 
activation of personally familiar faces. Observers had to discriminate between normal 
and altered faces of themselves and a close friend. Devue and colleagues (2007) found 
activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus and of the right insula for the self-face 
compared with the personally familiar face. However, in contrast to the preceding 
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studies, they did not find activation of the left fusiform gyrus. Other studies have 
replicated these results, but also obtained additional activation of the inferior occipital 
gyrus for the own face compared to familiar faces (Kaplan, Aziz-Zadeh, Uddin, & 
Iacoboni, 2008; Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2005). 
In summary, neuroimaging studies have shown the implication of brain 
structures in both hemispheres in self-face recognition. Although these studies are 
incongruent regarding specific brain regions, it seems that a complex bilateral network 
is involved in self-recognition. This network seems to comprise frontal, parietal and 
occipital brain structures of both hemispheres (for a review, see Devue & Brédart, 
2011). 
 
1.4.4 Event-related potential studies 
Given its high temporal resolution, event-related potentials (ERPs) are a useful 
technique to identify the time course of information processing (see Luck, 2014). The 
ERP technique has been used extensively in face processing research (for a review, see 
Schweinberger, 2011). By comparison, research about the ERPs involved in the 
processing of the own face is scarce. 
The N170 component is probably the best-known face-related component. This 
negative inflection peaks approximately 170 ms after stimulus presentation at lateral 
occipital electrodes sites and is larger for faces than for other visual stimuli (Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Pérez, & McCarthy, 1996). This component is considered to reflect early 
perceptual stages of face processing which precede recognition (Bruce & Young, 1986; 
Eimer, 2000, 2011). However, recent research suggests also that this component is 
modulated by the own face (e.g., Caharel et al., 2002; Keyes, Brady, Reilly, & Foxe, 




an unfamiliar face and flowers, the N170 is larger for the own face compared to the 
other stimuli (Keyes et al., 2010). This result contradicts the assumption that the N170 
simply reflects the structural encoding of a face and suggests a strong representation 
for the self-face in early perceptual stages.  
A subsequent component that has been linked more strongly to the activation 
of identity representations for familiar faces is the N250 (Schweinberger, Pickering, 
Jentzsch, Burton, & Kaufmann, 2002; Schweinberger, 2011; Tanaka, Curran, 
Porterfield, & Collins, 2006). This component consists of a negative inflection, which 
peaks 250 ms after the presentation of a known face at temporal electrodes. For this 
reason, this component has been related to the activation of the identity representations 
of familiar faces (see Schweinberger, 2011). Some research has also shown that this 
component is more negative for the own face compared to unfamiliar faces (Pierce et 
al., 2011; Tanaka et al., 2006). For example, Tanaka et al. (2006) showed that the N250 
component was enhanced for the own face compared to an unfamiliar target face in the 
first half of the experiment. However, in the second half of the experiment, the N250 
was similar for both the own face and the target face. These results suggest that the 
N250 reflects two different indexes of facial memory: one for pre-existing familiar 
face representation, such as the own face, and one for newly acquired face 
representation, such as the target face (for related results, see Kaufman, 
Schweinberger, & Burton, 2009). 
Later ERP components have also been implicated in self-face processing. For 
example, the P300 is considered to reflect the arousal or emotional saliency of stimuli. 
An early self-face ERP study, showed that the P300 component was larger for the own 
face compared with unfamiliar faces (Ninomiya, Onitsuka, Chen, Sato, & Tashiro, 
23 
 
1998). By contrast, the N400 component seems to reflect semantic access. In the face 
processing domain, it has been linked to access to biographical information (Kaufmann 
et al., 2009). Buttler, Mattingley, Cunnington and Suddendorf (2013) showed a larger 
1DPSOLWXGHIRUWKHRZQIDFHFRPSDUHGWRWKHIDFHVRIREVHUYHU¶VGL]\JRWLFWZLQ
siblings (see also Caharel, Courtay, Bernard, Lalonde, & Rebaï, 2005).  
In conclusion, although a specific ERP component for the processing of the 
self-face does not appear to exist, ERPs components reflecting the structural encoding 
(N170), recognition (N250), stimulus saliency (P300) and semantic identity 
representations (N400) show a stronger response to the RZQIDFHFRPSDUHGWRRWKHUV¶
faces. 
 
1.5 Face learning  
Face recognition requires that a seen face is matched to a stored, internal 
representation of that identity (Bruce & Young, 1986). Theories of face recognition 
postulate that this internal representation is not tied to a specific instance of a seen face, 
but is activated by any facial exemplar of this person (see, e.g., Burton, Bruce, & 
Johnston, 1990; Bruce & Young, 1986). Thus, this internal representation should be 
tolerant to changes in the appearance of a face, such as variation in lighting direction 
or facial pose (see, e.g., Bruce, 1982; Longmore, Liu, & Young, 2008). A question that 
arises is how this internal representation is created so that a previously unfamiliar face 
- the face of someone unknown - becomes sufficiently familiar for recognition to occur. 
Current theories suggest that one way to operationalize this process could be the 




Figure 3. An illustration of a face average (the central image) and its constituent photographs. Sourced 
from http://homepages.abdn.ac.uk/m.burton/pages/averages.html.  
 
The averaging process consists of the integration of different instances of the 
same face into a single representation (Burton, Jenkins, Hancock, & White, 2005). This 
process works as follow (for further details, see Burton et al., 2005; Jenkins & Burton, 
2011). Firstly, the shape of each face is captured by marking the xy coordinates of key 
facial features (e.g., positions of corners of mouth, eyes, tip of the nose, etc.). During 
this stage, the face region is segmented from the background. In a subsequent stage, 
the marked images are then coregistered by morphing them to a standard template 
using bi-cubic interpolation. For each face, the average texture from each co-registered 
images is derived by calculating the mean intensity values at each pixel, and the 
average shape of the corresponding unregistered images by calculating the mean xy 
FRRUGLQDWHVRIHDFKPDUNHGNH\IDFLDOIHDWXUH7KHQHDFKSHUVRQ¶VDYHUDJHWH[WXUHLV
morphed to their average shape to produce the stabilized image of their face. 
Information that is relevant to the identity of a person, and therefore present 
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consistently across encounters, is combined to form this stabilized image. In contrast, 
non-diagnostic information, such as lighting direction, which is not relevant to identity, 
is eliminated naturally because their effect will be cancelled out across different 
instances. 
This theoretical account can provide a robust method to simulate face 
recognition (Burton, Jenkins, & Schweinberger, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2008; 
Robertson, Kramer, & Burton, 2015). Importantly, however, these theories also 
provide a good account of face learning (see, e.g., Burton, Kramer, Ritchie, & Jenkins, 
in press; Kramer, Ritchie, & Burton, 2015; Leib et al., 2014). Accordingly, the created 
internal representation of a particular face is strongly tied to the experience of that 
identity, whereby every additional exposure to a face strengthens its average and thus 
leads to a stronger internal representation (Burton et al., 2005, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 
2008). 
More relevant for the current purpose, this theoretical approach can also explain 
two interrelated aspects of self-face recognition, namely how a visual representation 
of the own face is created (see Nielsen, Dissanayake, & Kashima, 2003) and how this 
representation accommodates changes in physical appearance during the lifespan (e.g. 
age, hairstyle, etc.). According to this perspective, any new instance of the own face 
would be incorporated into the averaging process to naturally deal with changes in the 
appearance. However, although such perspectives can explain how the representation 
of the own face is created and updated, it does not explain the self-referential process 
RINQRZLQJWKDWRQHSDUWLFXODUIDFHLVLQIDFWRQH¶VRZQHJ'HYXH	%UHGDUW
Morin, 2006). A possible theoretical framework for understanding this self-referential 





1.6 Embodied cognition: a new perspective in cognitive psychology  
7KH HPERGLHG FRJQLWLRQ SHUVSHFWLYH LV FRQVLGHUHG µWKH QH[W VWHS LQ WKH
HYROXWLRQ RI FRJQLWLYH VFLHQFHV¶ (Shapiro, 2011, p. 1). This new perspective 
distinguishes three different themes of discussion or theoretical positions. The first of 
WKHVHWKHRUHWLFDOSRVLWLRQVLVµFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ¶3URSRQHQWVRIWKLVYLHZFRQVLGHUHU
that the concepts that an organism acquires are limited by its body. In this sense, the 
body is treated as the door to knowledge, so organisms differing in the properties of 
their bodies will differ in their understanding of the surrounding world. The second 
WKHRUHWLFDOSRVLWLRQLVµUHSODFHPHQW¶$FFRUGLQJWKHFODVVLFDOYLHZLQRUGHUWRLQWHUDFW
with the surrounding world, the organism need to create a mental representation of the 
environment (i.e., symbolic representation, Neisser, 1967). In contrast, the embodied 
cognition view assumes that the mere interaction of the organism with its surrounding 
world replaces the need of the concept of mental representation (see Hurley, 2001). In 
fact, radical embodiment cognition approaches deny the existence of such mental 
representations (e.g., Van Gelder, 1995; Wilson & Golonka, 2013; but see also 
Barsalou, 2008; Shapiro, 2011; Svensson & Ziemke, 2005). The third theoretical 
SRVLWLRQLVµFRQVWLWXWLRQ¶ZKLFKUHIOHFWVWKHYLHZWKDWWKHERG\DQGWKHHQYLURQPHQW, 
are the components of cognition, but not the cause.    
Some embodiment cognition approaches deny the concept of symbolic 
representation. This stance also implies the denial of the classical cognitive view that 
these symbolic representations are manipulated by the use syntactic structures (i.e., a 
systematic set of rules to encode semantic information about the world; see Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1988). Advocates of embodied cognition criticises two additional aspects of 
the traditional cognitive perspective (see Hurley, 2001). The first concerns the view 
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that perception and action are dissociable processes. According to the embodiment 
perspective, these two processes are interactive and closely linked, such that one 
cannot be understood without the other. The second view suggests that cognition is the 
central core of the mind but can be decomposed into different modules. The classical 
cognitive perspective assumes that these modules would operate independently from 
each other and from lower-level cognitive processes, such as perception and action. 
Moreover, perception and action would not only be dissociable from each other but 
also from higher-level cognitive processes such as language and reasoning. The 
embodiment perspective does not deny the existence of such modules but assumes that 
these are interactive. Therefore, higher-level cognitive processes, such as reasoning 
and language, would affect lower-level cognitive processes, such as perception and 
action, and vice versa.  
In conclusion, the embodiment approach offers a new perspective for 
understanding cognition and behaviour. This new approach asserts that the brain is not 
the only cognitive resource available to solve problems. Instead, it is the interaction 
between the whole body - including the brain - and its actions in the environment that 
determines cognitive processes (see Wilson & Golonka, 2013).  
 
1.7 Embodiment and body experience: the rubber hand illusion  
Models of identity and self-awareness (see Morin, 2006) assume that the body, 
or public self-information, directly affects our cognitive processes, or private self-
information (see Morin, 2006). However, these models do not explain the self-
refeUHQWLDOSURFHVVRINQRZLQJWKDWDERG\RUDSDUWLFXODUERG\SDUWLVLQIDFWRQH¶V
own. On the contrary, the embodiment perspective assumes that the interaction 
between the body and its actions builds cognitive processes. Thus, according to this 
28 
 
perspective a sense of body ownership will be acquired as consequence of the mutual 
interaction of the organism with the environment.  
A striking aspect of this assumption is that it leaves open the possibility of 
µHPERG\LQJ¶REMHFWVGXULQJLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKWKHPIn support of this notion, watching 
a rubber-KDQGEHLQJVWURNHGLQV\QFKURQ\EXWQRWLQDV\QFKURQ\ZLWKRQH¶VRZQKDQG
SURGXFHVWKHIHHOLQJWKDWWKHUXEEHUKDQGLVLQIDFWRQH¶VRZQ%RWYLQLFN	&RKHQ
1998; see also Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; see Figure 4). This illusion is such that 
observers judge their unseen own hand to be located closer to the rubber hand (i.e., 
proprioceptive drift) and also report a sense of owning the rubber hand. Interestingly, 
it is possible to induce the rubber hand illusion even when colour properties of the 
UXEEHUKDQGDUHGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHFRORXUSURSHUWLHVRIWKHREVHUYHU¶VKDQG)DUPHU
Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012; Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013a). 
These results show that synchronous multisensory stimulation (SMS) affect the sense 
of body ownership.  
 
 
Figure 4. An illustration of the rubber hand illusion paradigm. When observers receive synchronous 
multisensory stimulation with a rubber hand, they experience a sense of ownership over this fake hand. 




Rubber-hand effects have also been obtained without touching, for example, 
ZKHQ WKHUH LVV\QFKURQ\RIPRYHPHQWEHWZHHQDUXEEHUDQGRQH¶VRZQKDQGHJ
Dummer, Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Riemer et al., 2014). This shows that 
the sense of body ownership is not specific to the multisensory integration of vision 
and tactile information, but to the detection of self-specifying intersensory correlations 
(see Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Dummer et al., 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005). 
But what does it mean to embody a hand? Psychometric studies (see Longo, 
Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008) have identified four different 
components which explain the experience of the rubber hand ownership. These 
components are present in both the synchronous and asynchronous conditions, but to 
different extents. The first component, which is called self-identification, is related to 
the sense of owing the hand. The subcomponents of this components are: ownership 
LHWKHIHHOLQJWKDWWKHUXEEHUKDQGZDVSDUWRIRQH¶VRZQERG\ORFDWLRQLHWKH
feeling that the rubber hand was in the same place as the own hand), and agency (i.e., 
the feeling of being able to move the rubber hand). The second component, which is 
called loss of own handLVUHODWHGWRWKHGLVSODFHPHQWRIDQREVHUYHU¶VRZQKDQG7KLV
component suggests that, during the illusion, observers not only incorporate the rubber 
hand as part of their RZQERG\EXWWKHUXEEHUKDQGDOVRGLVSODFHVREVHUYHUV¶RZQKDQG
The third component, which is called movement, is related to the feeling of movement 
of the own hand. This reflects that observers report a stronger feeling of movement of 
the own hand after the asynchronous than the synchronous stimulation condition in the 
rubber hand paradigm. Lastly, the fourth component, which is called affect, is related 
to how enjoyable the touch on the hand was.  
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The sense of body ownership has been studied mainly with hands. However, 
the hands are not the only body part that is susceptible to rubber hand illusion-like 
effects. Similar effects have been reported with arms (Guterstam, Petkova, & Ehrsson, 
2011) and even the whole body (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; 
Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et al., 2011). This embodiment of a limb or an entire 
ERG\ WKDW LV QRW RQHV¶ RZQ LV VWULNLQJ IURP D SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO SRLQW RI YLHZ
However, the hands or arms of different people can be highly similar in appearance 
and not very distinctive. Interestingly, more distinctive body parts, such as the face, 
which plays an important role key for the recognition of the self and others, are also 
susceptible to rubber hand-like effects (e.g., Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jiménez, Grehl 
& Tsakiris, 2012a; Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard & Aglioti, 2010; Maister, Tsiakkas & 
7VDNLULVE7KLV µHQIDFHPHQWHIIHFW¶ 6IRU]DHW DOQRWRQO\ DIIHFWV WKH
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO H[SHULHQFH RI RZQLQJ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V IDFH EXW DOVR DIIHFWV
performance in self-recognition tasks.  
 
1.8 (PERG\LQJRWKHUV¶IDFHVWKHHQIDFHPHQWLOOXVLRQ 
It has been classically assumed that the visual representation of the own face is 
rather stable (Miyakoshi, Kanayama, Nomura, Iidaka, & Ohira & 2008, Porciello et 
al., 2014). This implies that people would recognize their own face because they can 
match the visual input from mirrors or photographs with their view-invariant internal 
representation (Bruce, 1982; Bruce & Young, 1986). However, the fact that faces are 
also susceptible to rubber hand-like effects (e.g., Tsakiris, 2008; Tajadura-Jiménez et 
al., 2012a; Sforza, et al., 2010; Maister et al., 2013) suggests that this self-face 
representation is much more malleable than was previously thought. This is striking, 
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as faces form a distinctive aspect of human appearance and play an important role in 
the recognition of the self and others. 
,Q WKH FODVVLFDO µHQIDFHPHQW¶ SDUDGLJP REVHUYHUV ZHUH SUHVHQWHG ZLWK D
sequence of morphed images between their own and an unknown face (Tsakiris, 2008). 
This sequence started either with 0% of the self-face, that is by showing exclusively 
the unknown face, or with 100% self-IDFH WKDW LVE\VKRZLQJRQH¶VRZQIDFH7KH
blend of the faces increased with time from self-to-RWKHURUYLFHYHUVD2EVHUYHUV¶WDVN
was to stop the video when they considered that the face looked more like the self. 
After this baseline stage, observers were shown a morphed face, which consisted of an 
even blend (50/50%) between their own and the unknown face. This image was stroked 
with a paint brush on the cheek every two seconds. Observers were stroked either in 
spatial-temporal synchrony or in temporal asynchrony (i.e., at a 1-second delay). After 
that, observers performed the same self-recognition task, so that they had to stop the 
video when they considered that the face looked more like the self (see Figure 5). 
Compared with the baseline stage, observers accepted more aspects of the other face 
as their own at this post-stimulation test. However, this bias in self-recognition was 
found after synchronous but not after asynchronous stimulation. In addition, an 
enfacement questionnaire showed that observers experienced a stronger subjective 
enfacement illusion after the synchronous than the asynchronous condition (see 
Tsakiris, 2008). These results seem to indicate that synchronous, but not asynchronous, 
multisensory stimulation updates the cognitive representations of our own face and 
produces a bias in self-recognition. 
7KLVHIIHFWKDVEHHQUHSOLFDWHGZLWKµOLYH¶PRGHOV6IRU]DHWDO,QWKLV
study, observers were recruited in pairs of the same gender. Observers were also 
already familiar with each other. During the stimulation stage, both observers received 
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either synchronous or asynchronous multisensory stimulation. Then, observers 
performed the self-other discrimination task. As in previous studies, they saw more 
aspects of themselves in the model after synchronous than asynchronous stimulation. 
+RZHYHU WKH IDFW WKDW WKLV ZDV REVHUYHG ZLWK µOLYH¶ PRGHOV UDWKHU WKDQ VWDWLF IDFH
photographs has important theoretical implications for face recognition research. This 
shows that enfacement does not modify simple pictorial codes but structural, cognitive 
face representations (see Bruce & Young, 1986).  
 
 
Figure 5. An illustration of the enfacement paradigm (taken from Tsakiris, 2008). Figure 5a shows the 
self-other discrimination WDVN IURP µVHOI WR RWKHU¶ DQG IURP µRWKHU WR VHOI¶ )LJXUH E VKRZV WKH
stimulation stage of the enfacement paradigm. 
  
SMS of the face not only produces behavioural and subjective changes, but also 
changes in autonomic physiological responses, such as electrodermal activity (EDA) 
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and heart rate deceleration (HRD). Tajadura-Jiménez et al. (2012a) compared these 
autonomic physiological responses during synchronous and asynchronous 
multisensory stimulation and found that HRD increased in the former compared to the 
latter condition. This increased response appears to reflect a higher attentional level 
for the synchronous compared to the asynchronous condition (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 
2012a; see also Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). EDA activity was also increased 
for the synchronous stimulation. This was such that when a threatening object, such as 
DNQLIHDSSURDFKHGWKHRQVFUHHQPRGHO¶VIDFHREVHUYHUV¶('$UHVSRQVHVLQFUHDVHG
after synchronous but not asynchronous stimulation. This response was also evident in 
WKHV\QFKURQRXVFRQGLWLRQZKHQWKHWKUHDWHQLQJREMHFWDSSURDFKHGWKHPRGHO¶VIDFH
compared to a non-threatening object (e.g., a spoon, see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 
2012a). 
Psychometric research has tried to characterize the different aspects of the 
experience of identifying with a face (Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, Coleman, & Tsakiris, 
2012b). Three different components, which were common to the synchronous and the 
asynchronous condition, were found. The first of these component, which explained 
most variance, shows a qualitative difference between the conditions and was termed 
self-identification. In the synchronous condition, this reflects the visual identification 
of the observer with the onscreen face. In the asynchronous condition, on the other 
hand, this reflects a disruption of this visual identification and the simply imitation of 
the onscreen face. This component is similar to the self-identification component found 
for the rubber hand illusion (see Longo et al., 2008). However, it seems to differ in its 
structure in both illusions as no further subcomponents for self-identification have been 
found in the enfacement illusion (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). It has been proposed 
that this reflects the different importance that faces and hands have for self-identity, 
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which should be stronger for faces (see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). The second 
and the third components reflect quantitative differences between the synchronous and 
the asynchronous conditions. The second component, termed similarity, reflects the 
H[WHQWWRZKLFKREVHUYHUSHUFHLYHDPRGHO¶VIDFHDVVLPLODUWRWKHLURZQIDFHZKHUHDV
the third component, termed affect, reflects the extent to which observers judge the 
PRGHO¶VIDFHDVWUXVWZRUWK\DQGDWWUDFWLYH 
An interesting question that arises from this framework concerns the 
mechanism of the enfacement illusion. Are observers incorporating features of the 
model into their self-face representation or are they modifying the representation of 
WKH PRGHO¶V IDFH" 7DMDGXUD-Jiménez et al. (2012a) tried to answer this question by 
manipulating the directionality of the self-other discrimination task, by asking 
observers to perform this task in both the self-to-other and the other-to-self directions. 
In the first case, observers had to stop the video when the face looked more like the 
model. In the case of the other-to-self direction, observers had to stop the video when 
the face looked more like the self. Their results revealed an enfacement effect only in 
the other-to-self direction, whereby observers stopped the morphing sequence earlier 
in the synchronous than the asynchronous condition. That is, after synchronous 
stimulation, observers accept more features of the model as self, but not more features 
of self as the model. This seems to indicate that observers tend to incorporate the 
PRGHO¶Vface into their own self-face representation during SMS, but not vice versa.  
Further evidence for the directionality of this effect comes from research on 
gaze-following. Eye-gaze produces reflexive changes of visual attention, whereby 
observers shift their attention in the direction of a seen gaze (Crostella, Carducci, & 
Aglioti, 2009; Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti, & Chelazzi, 2002). These changes are 
more prominent when observers watch their own eye-gaze, as error rates for detecting 
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targets in an incongruent position with the gaze direction of an onscreen face is higher 
when thLV IDFH LVRQH¶VRZQ+XQJU	+XQW7KLV LQGLFDWHV WKDW WKHJD]HRI
RQH¶VRZQIDFHKDVDVWURQJHUGLVWUDFWLQJSRZHUWKDQWKDWRIRWKHUIDFHV and highlighted 
the relevance of the own face in social cognition. Intriguingly, SMS reduces this 
distracting power of the self-gaze, but it does not affect the distracting power of an 
HQIDFHGIDFH¶VJD]H3RUFLHOORHWDO7KLVFRQVWLWXWHVIXUWKHUHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH
HQIDFHPHQWLOOXVLRQLQGXFHVFKDQJHVLQWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQIDFHUDWKHUWKDQ
the faces of others. 
In summary, although it has been assumed previously that the representation of 
the own face is stable, recent research has challenged this view by showing that faces 
are readily susceptible to rubber hand-like effects. This enfacement effect appears to 
PRGLI\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHRZQIDFHEXWQRWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHPRGHO¶VIDFHWKDW
is presented for such stimulation purposes.  
 
1.9 Embodiment and social cognition 
The research reviewed in the preceding sections shows that the borders of the 
RZQERG\GHILQH WKH H[SHULHQFHRIRQH¶V VHOI E\ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ WKDWREVHUYHUV FDQ
HPERG\RWKHUV¶SK\VLFDOIHDWXUHVVXFKDVKDQGVRUIDFHV2QHTXHVWLRQWKDWDULVHVIURP
these findings is whether the factors that affect the perceptual cognitive representations 
of the own body also affect this cognitive representation at a more conceptual or private 
level (see Morin, 2006). Some accounts of self-consciousness and identity suggest that 
feedback from the own body affects the self-concept (see Baumeister, 1999; Morin, 
2006; de Vignemont, 2007). Interestingly, this body experience also seems to affect 
the understanding that people have of others (for review, see Maister, Slater, Sanchez-
Vives, & Tsakiris, 2015). For example, studies into the mirror neuron system have 
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shown that people activate similar brain structures when performing an action and 
seeing others performing this action (Keysers & Gazzola, 2009; Maister et al., 2015). 
An example of how the mirror neuron system works comes from the body resonance 
literature and the visual remapping of touch effect (e.g., Làdavas & Serino, 2010; 
Serino, Pizzoferrato, & Làdavas, 2008, 2009). This effect refers to the increased 
sensitivity to tactile stimulation when seeing someone else being touched. This effect 
seems to be modulated by similarity in physical features, such as the face, and more 
conceptual terms, such as political preference and ethnic group (see Serino et al., 
2009).  
Based on these studies, embodied accounts of social cognition suggest that the 
perception of the cognitive states of others activates similar states in the self (e.g., 
Baumeister & Bushman, 2014; Kubota, Banaji, & Phelps, 2012; Niedenthal, 2007; 
Serino et al., 2009). Thus, according to these theories we do not only incorporate 
physical features of an embodied person but also social and conceptual features. This 
implies that the limits of KXPDQV¶SK\VLFDODQGFRQFHSWXDOfeatures are vague. 
Research into the rubber hand and enfacement illusion seems to support these 
embodied accounts of social cognition. For example, after SMS of the face observers 
not only report to be physically more similar to the model, but also feel personally 
closer and more attracted toward the model (see Paladino, Mazzurega, Pavani, & 
Schubert, 2010). In addition, when observers are asked to estimate the number of a set 
of onscreen elements and are informed about the estimate made by the enfaced face, 
WKHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHREVHUYHUDQGWKHHQIDFHGIDFH¶VHVWLPDWHVDUHVPDOOHUDIWHU
synchronous stimulation (see Paladino et al., 2010).  
As SMS seems to blur the perceptual distance between the self and other, 
according to embodied simulation theories of emotion recognition (e.g., Niedenthal, 
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2007), it should also be possible to enhance emotion recognition after such stimulation. 
A recent study showed this effect (see Maister, Tsiakkas, & Tsakiris, 2013b). In a pre-
stimulation stage, participants were asked to perform an emotion recognition task. In 
a second stage, participants watched a two-minute video and received either 
synchronous or asynchronous stimulation or no stimulation (no-touch condition). 
Then, they completed a post-stimulation emotion recognition task. Importantly, each 
participant received a total of three blocks (synchronous, asynchronous and no-touch) 
randomized between participants and the model used was kept constant during the 
whole experiment. The results showed that observers recognise fearful facial 
expressions better after synchronous stimulation than asynchronous stimulation.  
In this context, one factor that is physically and sociologically salient is racial 
group (see Maister et al., 2015). On the whole, people tend to show negative biases 
toward members of a different racial group (e.g., Hall, Crisp, & Suen, 2009; Inzlicht, 
Gutsell, & Legault, 2012; Maister et al., 2013a). Interestingly, it has been suggested 
that SMS might modulate such racial prejudice. For example, after enfacing a black 
face, observers showed an increase of the visual remapping of touch effect for that 
particular black face. This effect seems to be amplified in observers who have a 
stronger implicit bias against outgroup members (Fini, Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, 
Serino, & Tsakiris, 2013). However, this study did not include a post-stimulation 
measure of racial prejudice. Consequently, it is impossible to determine whether 
increased visual remapping of touch was simply due to an increased preference toward 
the enfaced black face or whether this reflects a more general decrease of racial 
prejudice (see Paladino et al., 2010). Whereas this research suggests that implicit bias 
affects the body experience, the question arises also whether this relationship is 
bidirectional, so that the body experience can affect racial prejudice. A recent study 
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showed that observers who reported a stronger sense of ownership over a black rubber 
hand also show less implicit racial prejudice, as measured with the Implicit Association 
Task (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). However, this effect was 
independent of whether synchronous or asynchronous stimulation was delivered 
(Maister et al., 2013a), which indicates that it is the feeling of ownership, and not the 
type of stimulation delivered, that produced the reduction in racial prejudice. It is 
unresolved whether different effects can be obtained with faces. This is therefore an 
important question for further research. 
 
1.10 Thesis structure   
The aim of this thesis is to further explore the effects of synchronous 
multisensory stimulation of the face on physical and psychological aspects of the self. 
Chapter 2 investigates whether synchronous multisensory stimulation of white 
Caucasian observers with a black face can reduce racial prejudice. Across three 
H[SHULPHQWVZKLWHREVHUYHUV¶IDFHVDUHVWURNHGZLWKDFRWWRQEXGZKLOHWKHy watch a 
black face being stroked in synchrony on a computer screen. This is compared with a 
neutral condition, in which no tactile stimulation is administered during exposure to a 
EODFNIDFH([SHULPHQWDQGDQGZLWKDFRQGLWLRQLQZKLFKREVHUYHUV¶faces are 
stroked in temporal asynchrony with the black onscreen face (Experiment 3). After the 
stimulation stage, racial prejudice is measured both implicitly, with a name-race IAT 
HJ+DOOHWDODQGH[SOLFLWO\ZLWK/HSRUHDQG%URZQ¶VUDFLDOprejudice scale 
(Lepore & Brown, 1997). In Experiment 2, the name-face IAT is then replaced with 
face-race version to provide a more sensitive test of racial prejudice (Dasgupta, 
McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). In the last experiment in this chapter 
(Experiment 3), several changes are then introduced, by replacing the neutral 
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stimulation condition with asynchronous stimulation and by using a single category 
IAT as a more specific measure of attitudes toward black people (Karpinski & 
Steinman, 2006). 
Chapter 3 then explores whether it is possible to induce an enfacement-like 
illusion with a novel gaze-contingent eye-tracking paradigm, which is more similar to 
WKH H[SHULHQFH RI ORRNLQJ DW RQH¶V RZQ IDFH LQ D PLUURU 7KLV SDUDGLJP KDV EHHQ
inspired by the enfacement literature but tries to provide a more direct method for 
stimulation. In this gaze-contingent paradigm, the eye-gaze direction of an unfamiliar 
IDFH RQ D FRPSXWHU VFUHHQ IROORZV REVHUYHUV¶ H\H-gaze, which is tracked with 
millisecond accuracy. ThuVZKHQREVHUYHUV¶H\HVPRYHWKHH\HVRIWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH
move in synchrony. This congruent condition is compared with an incongruent 
condition, in which the eyes of the onscreen face move in different directions to that 
of the observer (Experiment 4 and 6), and with a neutral condition, in which the eyes 
of the onscreen face are static and unresponsive (Experiment 5).  
There are two main advantages of this new method compared to the traditional 
enfacement paradigm. Firstly, in the latter observers always receive stimulation 
passively, by being stroked on the cheek with a cotton bud by an experimenter (but see 
Tajadura-Jiménez, Lorusso, & Tsakiris, 2013). In the new method introduced in 
Chapter 3, observers control such stimulation actively with their own eye movements. 
Secondly, while stroking that observers receive in the traditional enfacement paradigm 
must be synchronized with that of the model, the new method of Chapter 3 acts like a 
PLUURUUHIOHFWLRQ7KXVLWLVDOZD\VWKHPRGHO¶VIDFHWKDWUHVSRQGV WRWKHREVHUYHUV¶
behaviour. To measure the effect of this manipulation on self-recognition, the same 
measures that have been used to study the enfacement illusion were applied: a self-
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other discrimination task and an enfacement questionnaire (e.g., Maister et al., 2013; 
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012).  
The final experimental chapter then examines the cognitive locus of the 
enfacement effect using Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). The fact that the own face 
modulates ERP components involved in the early perceptual stages of face processing 
(i.e., the N170 component, see Eimer, 2011), the activation of facial identity (i.e., the 
N250 component, see Schweinberger, 2011), and the emotional response to stimuli 
(i.e., the P300, see Renault, Signoret, Debruille, Breton, & Bolgert, 1989) suggest that 
these components can be used also to explore the cognitive locus of the enfacement 
effect. In Experiment 7, observers therefore were exposed to blocks of synchronous 
and asynchronous stimulation. After each block, ERPs were recorded while observers 
performed a face target detection task. In this task, observers were presented with 
pictures of their own face, a synchronously or asynchronously stimulated face, filler 
faces, and a learned target face. Observers were instructed to respond when the target 
was presented. If enfacement affects the early perceptual encoding of faces, then the 
N170 elicited by the own face should be similar to that elicited by a synchronously 
stimulated face, but not an asynchronously stimulated face. If, on the other hand, 
enfacement causes the updating of identity representations, then the N250 should be 
more similar for the own face and the synchronously stimulated face. Finally, if 
enfacement triggers an emotional arousal response, then the P300 component should 
be similar for the own face and the synchronously-stimulated, but not the 










Multisensory stimulation with other-race 





The cognitive representation of our own body is flexible and constantly 
updated. A striking illustration of this effect comes from the rubber hand illusion. 
Watching a rubber-KDQGEHLQJVWURNHGLQV\QFKURQ\ZLWKRQH¶VRZQKDQGSURGXFHVWKH
feeOLQJWKDWWKHUXEEHUKDQGLVLQIDFWRQH¶VRZQ%RWYLQLFN	&RKHQ7VDNLULV
& Haggard, 2005). This illusion does not appear when observers simply watch a rubber 
hand (that is not stroked) or when asynchronous stimulation is given, by inducing a 
GHOD\EHWZHHQWKHVWURNLQJRIWKHUXEEHUKDQGDQGREVHUYHU¶VRZQ0RUHRYHUDVLPLODU
effect has also been observed with other body parts, such as arms (Guterstam et al., 
2011), and even the whole body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova et al., 2011).  
Interestingly, faces are also susceptible to rubber hand-like effects (see, e.g., 
Maister et al., 2013b; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 
)RUH[DPSOHZKHQREVHUYHUV¶RZQIDFHLVVWURNed in synchrony with a target 
face, they tend to perceive the target face as more similar to their own face (see, e.g., 
Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 
2008). This perceptual effect is accompanied by a phenomenological illusion that the 
other face belongs to the observer. This bias in self-UHFRJQLWLRQRU³HQIDFHPHQWHIIHFW´
(Sforza et al., 2010) is not found after asynchronous stimulation. This indicates that 
synchronous, but not asynchronous, multisensory stimulation supports the updating of 
the cognitive representations of the own face. 
These embodiment effects are not only informative about the characteristics of 
cognitive representations of the body, but also provide insight into social cognition. 
Embodied accounts suggest that the body experience determines sociocognitive 
processing (e.g., Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004), and research of the rubber hand 
and enfacement illusions support this claim (e.g., Bufalari, Lenggenhager, Porciello, 
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Serra-Holmes, & Aglioti, 2014; Fini et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2013a; Maister et al., 
2013b; Paladino et al., 2010). For example, after synchronous multisensory stimulation 
(SMS) with an unfamiliar face, observers report more positive affective reactions and 
show more conformity behaviour (i.e., \LHOGLQJWRRWKHUV¶YLHZVRURSLQLRQVtoward 
the unfamiliar face, than after asynchronous stimulation (Paladino et al., 2010). This 
effect is also seen in the domain of emotion recognition, as SMS of the face enhances 
REVHUYHUV¶VHQVLWLYLW\WRRWKHUV¶IHDUIXOIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQV0DLVWHUHWDOE7KHVH
findings suggests that synchronous multisensory stimulation blurs self-other 
boundaries not only with regard to physical appearance but also in a more social sense, 
by reducing the differences between the self and the face presented during the 
stimulation stage (i.e., enfaced face). As consequence, the enfaced face is held to be 
included into the mental representation of the self (i.e., self-space, Paladino et al., 2010; 
Schubert, & Otten, 2002), by producing an overlapping of the representations of the 
self and the enfaced face (see Tsakiris, 2010; Paladino et al., 2010).  
Such differences reduction also seems to be an important concept for 
understanding other social behaviours, such as intergroup relations (Billing & Tajfel, 
1973; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; Hall et al., 2009). For example, when white 
Caucasian observers are asked to list attributes that white and black people share, the 
differences between these groups are blurred, which produces a positive effect in the 
reduction of prejudice (Hall et al., 2009). Other tasks, such as behavioural mimicry and 
intergroup contact, are also based on the reduction of self-other differences and have 
been employed to decrease prejudice toward outgroup members (see Crips & Turner, 
2009; Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Inzlicht et al., 
2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner, Crisp, & Lambert, 2007). For example, when 
white observers mimic some simple actions of a black actor, such as reaching and 
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grasping a glass, they subsequently show reduced implicit racial prejudice on the 
Affect Misattribution Paradigm (Inzlicht et al., 2012; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & 
Stewart, 2005). Similarly, contact between members of different groups seems to 
reduce prejudice toward the outgroup (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), even when this 
intergroup contact is imagined (Crips & Turner, 2009; Turner et al., 2007; Turner & 
Crisp, 2010). For example, observers who imagine contact with an elderly person 
subsequently demonstrate less implicit bias toward the elderly compared to control 
observers (Turner & Crisp, 2010; Experiment 1), and similar results are found when 
non-Muslim observers imagine contact with Muslims (Turner & Crisp, 2010; 
Experiment 2). 
This research shows that SMS, intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry 
share two important features. Firstly, all of these tasks require that observers have some 
contact with other people. In SMS, this contact is produced through mirror-like 
reflection, as observers receive specular stimulation with the onscreen face (see, e.g., 
Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2008). In behavioural mimicry, the contact with the other 
LVSURGXFHGWKURXJKWKHLPLWDWLRQRIRWKHUV¶DFWLRQV,Q]OLFKWHWal., 2012). And in the 
case of intergroup contact, the contact is produced face-to-face or simply can be 
imagined (see, e.g., Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner & Crisp, 2010). Secondly, in all 
of these tasks the differences between the self and the other is reduced by increasing 
the overlap of their mental representations (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2009; Paladino et al., 
2010; Farmeret al., 2012; Inzlicht et al., 2012; Turner & Crisp, 2010).  
If SMS, imagined intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry share these 
features, and imagined intergroup contact and behavioural mimicry reduce prejudice 
toward outgroup members, then it is possible that SMS produces a similar effect in 
prejudice reduction. Some recent research already supports this idea. For example, 
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after enfacing a black face, observers showed an increase of the visual remapping of 
touch effect, which is an increased tactile sensitivity in observers when viewing 
another person being touched (see Cardini, Tajadura-Jiménez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 
2012; Marcoux et al., 2013), for that particular black face. This effect seems to be 
amplified in observers who have a stronger implicit bias against outgroup members 
(Fini et al., 2013). However, this study did not include a post-stimulation measure of 
racial prejudice. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether the increased 
visual remapping of touch was simply due to an increased preference for the enfaced 
black face (see, e.g., Paladino et al., 2010) or whether this reflects a more general 
decrease of raFLDO SUHMXGLFH $QRWKHU VWXG\ VKRZHG WKDW REVHUYHUV¶ ZKR UHSRUWHG D
stronger sense of ownership over a black rubber hand also show less implicit racial 
prejudice, as measured with the Implicit Association Task (IAT: Greenwald et al., 
1998). However, this effect was independent of whether synchronous or asynchronous 
stimulation was delivered (Maister et al., 2013a), which indicates that it was the feeling 
of ownership, and not the type of stimulation delivered, what produced the reduction 
in racial prejudice. 
In light of these findings, the present study sought to directly investigate the 
effect of SMS of the face on the reduction of racial prejudice. For this purpose, in 
Experiment 1 and 2, white observers received facial tactile stimulation that was 
synchronous with the stroking of a black onscreen face, or received no stimulation 
while the black face was being watched (i.e., neutral stimulation). In Experiment 3, 
Caucasian observers then received either synchronous or asynchronous stimulation 
with a black face. To measure the effect of this manipulation on racial prejudice, the 
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998), which provides an implicit measure of intergroup 
attitudes toward different ethnic groups, nationalities, religions and sexes (see 
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Schnabel, Asendorpf, & Greenwald, 2008) was employed. In the current study, the 
IAT compares the fluency, in terms of reaction times, with which observers match 
stimuli that correspond either to ingroup or outgroup categories (e.g., white and black 
faces) with words that carry a positive or negative meaning (e.g., peace and anger). In 
this paradigm, an increase in reaction times to match outgroup related stimuli with 
positive words and a decrease to match outgroup related stimuli with negative words 
is considered to reflect implicit prejudice toward the outgroup. Racial prejudice was 
DOVR PHDVXUHG H[SOLFLWO\ ZLWK /HSRUH DQG %URZQ¶V  VXEWOH UDFLDO SUHMXGLFH
questionnaire. This questionnaire measures prejudice toward black people on Likert 
scales and is suitable for British participants (see Lepore & Brown, 1996). It is 
SUHGLFWHGWKDWREVHUYHUVZRXOGVKRZOHVVSUHMXGLFHWRZDUGWKHPRGHO¶VHWKQLFJURXS




This experiment investigated whether SMS of the face produces a modulation 
in prejudice toward outgroup members, as is the case in imagined intergroup contact 
and mimicry paradigms (see, e.g., Turner & Crisp, 2010; Inzlicht et al., 2012). White 
observers were exposed to both a synchronous and a neutral stimulation condition with 
the face of a black model. After the stimulation stage, racial prejudice was measured 
implicitly, using the name-race IAT (Hall et al., 2009), and explicitly, with the subtle 
racial prejudice questionnaire (Lepore & Brown, 1997). If multisensory stimulation 








Thirty Caucasian females, with a mean age of 19 years (SD = 2.1), participated 
in this study. All were students at the University of Kent, who gave their informed 
consent to take part, and received either course credits or a small payment for 
participation. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Preparation of multisensory stimuli 
To create the stimuli for the multisensory stimulation, three black female 
models were video-recorded in full colour. Two different videos were recorded for 
each model. In both videos, the models look straight at the camera with a neutral 
expression. In the first video, which was recorded for the synchronous condition, the 
PRGHOV¶ULJKWFKHHNZDVVWURNHGZLWKDFRWWRQEXGHYHU\WZRVHFRQGVIRUWZRminutes. 
In the second video, the models did not receive any tactile stimulation. This video was 
used in the neutral condition  
The videos were presented in full-VFUHHQPRGHRQD¶¶VFUHHQPRQLWRUSODFHG
approximately 75 cm from observers. The faces in full-screen mode measured 
approximately 9 (W) by 19 (H) degrees of visual angle. A still image from the video 





Figure 6. Example video stills from the synchronous/asynchronous condition (left panel) and the neutral 
condition (right panel). 
 
The name-race IAT 
To measure racial attitudes, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et 
al., 1998) was displayed with Inquisit software Inquisit (Millisecond Software). 
Concepts and associations underpin semantic memory (see Collins & Quillian, 1969). 
Accordingly, related concepts (e.g., eagle-feathers) are not only more strongly 
associated in memory but also more efficiently processed than non-related concepts 
(e.g., eagle-bark). Based on these premises, the IAT measures the strength of 
associations between concepts (see Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, 
& Klauer, 2005). More specifically, it compares the fluency with which people match 
exemplars of a category (e.g., white and black; straight and gay, republican and 
democrat, etc.), with positive and negative meaning concepts. If an exemplar is 
positively associated, it would be matched more efficiently with positive meaning 
concepts than with negative meaning concepts. On the contrary, if an exemplar is 
negatively associated, it would be matched more efficiently with negative meaning 
concepts than with positive meaning concepts. In the specific case of the name-race 
IAT, it compares the fluency with which observers match stimuli that correspond either 
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to ingroup or outgroup categories (e.g., white and black names) with words that carry 
a positive or negative meaning (e.g., peace and anger). 
The stimuli in this IAT have been used in previous research (Hall et al., 2009) 
and comprise names for black and white people and words with a positive or negative 
meaning. The names were suitable for a British context and consisted of John, Paul, 
Brian, Pete, Robert, Katie, Sara, Susie, Melanie, Emily for white people, and of 
Latonya, Tanisha, Malika, Teretha, Lakisha, Leroy, Rasaan, Tyree, Deion, Lamont for 
black people. The positive words were Rainbow, Gift, Joy, Paradise, Laughter, 
Cuddle, Glory, Gold, Kindness, Peace, while the negative words were Sadness, Anger, 
Vomit, War, Hell, Slum, Slime, Filth, Stink, Cockroach. 
In this name-UDFH,$7WKHREVHUYHUV¶WDVNLVWRFODVVLI\ZRUGVDVSRVLWLYHRU
negative and names as black or white. These stimuli were presented in the centre of 
the screen in black Arial font at size 36. The task is comprised of five blocks (See 
Figure 7). In Block 1, observers were presented with words, which had to be classified 
DV SRVLWLYH RU QHJDWLYH DV TXLFNO\ DV SRVVLEOH E\ SUHVVLQJ WKH µ]¶ RU µP¶ NH\ RQ D
standard computer keyboard. In Block 2, observers were asked to classify names as 
ingroup (i.e., white names) or outgroup exemplars (i.e., black names). In Block 3, 
observers then performed the combined categorization of words and names. In this 
block, observers were presented with positive and negative words and ingroup and 
outgroup names. Observers were required to press WKHµ]¶NH\LI WKHVWLPXOXVZDVD
ZKLWHQDPHRUDSRVLWLYHZRUGDQGWKHµP¶NH\LIWKHVWLPXOXVZDVEODFNRUDQHJDWLYH
word. Block 4 was identical to Block 1 but with reversed keys. In Block 5, observers 
then also performed the combined categorization, but in this case the name-word 
relation was reversed compared to Blocks. Thus, if Blocks 3 combined white with 
positive and black with negative, then Block 5 combined white with negative and black 
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with positive. In line with previous work (Hall et al., 2009), Blocks 1, 2 and 4 were 
included for practice purposes. Blocks 3 and 5 were the critical blocks that were used 
to calculate a measure of prejudice. As all of our observers were Caucasian, the 
pairings white/positive words and black/negative words were congruent in this 
framework. On the other hand, white/negative words and black/positive words were 
incongruent. Blocks 1, 2 and 4 had 24 trials each and Blocks 3 and 5 had 48 each.  
 
 
Figure 7. Representation of the name-race IAT procedure. In the first block (a), observers had to classify 
words as positive or negative. In the second block (b), observers had to classify names as white or black 
exemplars. In Block 3 (c), observers performed the combined categorization of words and names. In the 
fourth block (d), as in Block 1, observers classified words as positive or negative, but in this block, they 
keys were reversed. In Block 5 (e), observers performed the combined categorization of words and 




IAT scores, also known as D scores, were calculated using the improved scoring 
algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The algorithm to calculate D scores is 
as follows (for further details see Greenwald et al., 2003). Firstly, mean reaction times 
for correct responses in Blocks 3 and 5 is calculated. Secondly, the standard deviation 
of all items (regardless if they were incorrect) is calculated in Blocks 3 and 5, but 
ignoring the block the trials came from.  Thirdly, RTs in incorrect trials in Block 3 are 
replaced for the mean of correct items in this block (calculated in the first step) plus 
600 ms. The same is applied to Block 5. In the fourth step, the mean RTs for Blocks 3 
and 5 is again calculated, but this time, incorrect trials in each block are replaced by 
the corrected average calculated in the previous step. Finally, the D score is computed 
as the average corrected RTs for the congruent block (Block 3 in Figure 7) minus the 
average corrected RTs for the incongruent block (Block 5 in Figure 7), divided for the 
standard deviation calculated in the second step. The resulting scores range between -
2 and +2. 
 
Prejudice scale  
/HSRUHDQG%URZQ¶VUDFLDOSUHMXGLFH scale was used to measure subtle 
explicit racial prejudice. This scale comprises 15 statements to assess prejudice toward 
black people (see Appendix). Participants rate their agreement with each statement on 
a 7-SRLQW/LNHUWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP³strongly GLVDJUHH´ WR³VWURQJO\DJUHH´. Scores 
on this scale range from 15 to 105, with a midpoint of 60 and high scores indicating 
lower prejudice. Previous research (see Lepore & Brown, 1997) has shown that this 
questionnaire is suitable for the British context and has good construct validity and a 






A set of 8 items was taken from Tajadura-Jiménez et al. (2012a; see also Maister et al., 
2013b). These items consist of statements that assess the subjective enfacement 
experience (see Table 1). Observers record their agreement with each statement on a 
7-point Likert scale, ranging from ³VWURQJO\ GLVDJUHH´ WR ³VWURQJO\ DJUHH´. These 
items are analysed separately but an overall enfacement score can also be calculated 
by summing the scores of all items. A high overall score indicates that observers felt 
that the onscreen face had become integrated with the internal representation of their 
own face during the stimulation stage (see Tajadura-Jiménez, Longo, Coleman, & 





3. It seemed like I was looking at my own mirror reflection. 
,WVHHPHGOLNHP\RZQIDFHEHJDQWRUHVHPEOHWKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VIDFH 
5. It seemed like my own face was out of my control. 
,WVHHPHGOLNHWKHRWKHU¶VIDFHEHJDQWRUHVHPEOHP\RZQIDFH 
7. It seemed like the experience of my face was less vivid than normal. 
8. I felt that I was imitating the other person. 
9. The touch I IHOWZDVFDXVHGE\WKHFRWWRQEXGWRXFKLQJWKHRWKHU¶VIDFH 
7KHWRXFK,VDZRQWKHRWKHU¶VIDFHZDVFDXVHGE\WKHFRWWRQEXGWRXFKLQJP\RZQIDFH 
 






In this experiment, observers first watched a two-minute video of a black model 
being stroked on the cheek with a cotton bud (in the synchronous condition) or without 
any tactile stimulation (in the neutral condition). While watching the videos of the 
synchronous condition, an identical cotton bud to that seen in the video was used to 
SURYLGH VSHFXODU WDFWLOH VWLPXODWLRQ WR WKHREVHUYHUV¶ left cheek. During the neutral 
video, no tactile stimulation was administered. After each of the videos, observers 
performed the IAT, the prejudice scale and the enfacement questionnaire. Each 
participant performed this sequence twice, once for the synchronous condition and 
once for the neutral condition. The model was kept constant for each observer. The 
order of these conditions and the identity of the model for each observer, was 
counterbalanced over the course of the experiment. 
 
Results 
Enfacement questionnaire  
To determine whether SMS affects how observers feel about the black onscreen 
face, responses to the enfacement questionnaire were analysed. These data are 
provided in Figure 8 as mean Likert responses to each of the items for the synchronous 
and the neutral condition. As can be seen in Figure 8, compared with the neutral 
condition, SMS influHQFHGREVHUYHUV¶IHHOLQJVDERXWWKHEODFNIDFH7KLVHIIHFWVZDV
such that observers were more likely to report that the black face was their own face 
in the synchronous condition than in the neutral condition (items 1, 2 and 3), paired 
sample t-tests, all ts(29)  3.28, ps < .01. Observers also reported feeling a greater 
resemblance between their own and the black face in the synchronous than in the 
neutral condition (items 4 and 6), both ts(29)  2.42, ps < .05. In addition, observers 
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were more likely to report that their own face was out of control and that the experience 
of their face was less vivid than normal in the synchronous than in the neutral condition 
(items 5 and 7), both ts(29)  2.33, ps < .05. However, observers were not more likely 
to report that they were imitating the other person (item 8) in the synchronous 
compared with the neutral condition, t(29) = 1.94, p = .06. 
 
Figure 8. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the synchronous (black bars) and the 
neutral (grey bars) condition in Experiment 1. Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
In addition, the overall enfacement score was calculated for each observer by 
summing the scores for items 1 to 8. A 2 x 2 mixed-factor ANOVA, with the within-
subjects factor stimulation (synchronous vs. neutral) and the between-subjects factor 
block order (synchronous first vs. neutral first) did not show a main effect of block 
order, F(1, 28) = 0.16, p    ڦ2p = .00, or interaction between block order and 
stimulation, F(1, 28) = 1.13, p  ڦ2p = .03. However, a main effect of stimulation 
was found, F(1, 28) = 18.23, p   ڦ2p = .39, which reflects a higher total 
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enfacement score in the synchronous (M = 29.5, SD = 10.9) than in the neutral 
condition (M = 22.1, SD = 9.8). 
 
Racial prejudice measures 
In a further step of our analysis, the scores for the IAT and the racial prejudice 
scale were analysed. For the IAT, D scores using the improved scoring algorithm (see 
above and Greenwald et al., 2003 for further details). This score ranges between -2 and 
+2. In this study, the pairings of white/positive words and black/negative words were 
congruent. Thus, positive scores indicated a preference toward ingroup members 
(white people in our case), which is interpreted as a sign of racial prejudice (e.g., Hall 
et al., 2009). IAT scores were similar across stimulation conditions (synchronous: M 
= 0.43, SD = 0.35; neutral: M = 0.35, SD = 0.39) and block order (synchronous first: 
M = 0.32, SD = 0.39; neutral first: M = 0.45, SD = 0.42). A 2 (stimulation: synchronous 
vs. neutral) x 2 (block order: synchronous first vs. neutral first) mixed-factor ANOVA 
did not show a main effect of stimulation or block order, or an interaction, all Fs(1, 28) 
ps  ڦV2p  
)RU/HSRUHDQG%URZQ¶VUDFLDOSUHMXGLFHVFDOHUHVSRQVHVWRLWHPV
and 14 were reversed, in line with the standard evaluation of this questionnaire. An 
overall score was then calculated for each observer by adding items 1 to 15 for each 
condition. These scores were similar across stimulation conditions (synchronous: M = 
71, SD = 10, max = 90, min = 52; neutral: M = 70, SD = 10, max = 89, min = 52) and 
block order (synchronous first: M = 70, SD = 14; neutral first: M = 71, SD = 15). The 
main effects of stimulation and order, and the interaction between these factors, were 
not significant, all Fsps ڦV2p  
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Overall, the scores from the IAT and the racial prejudice scale therefore suggest 
WKDW606GLGQRWDIIHFWREVHUYHUV¶UDFLDOSUHMXGLFHOHYHOV+RZHYHUUHFHQWUHVHDUFK
has also shown that the degree of the sense of ownership that observers experience 
over a black rubber hand relates to their racial prejudice (Maister et al., 2013a). Thus, 
it is still possible that the feeling of ownership over the black face affected racial 
prejudice, regardless of the type of stimulation delivered. To explore whether a similar 
relationship exists in the current study, Pearson correlations were conducted between 
the total enfacement score and the IAT and the explicit prejudice scale. As each subject 
performed a synchronous block and a neutral block, each of them gave two scores for 
each of the tasks (i.e., IAT, prejudice scale and enfacement questionnaire).  Pearson 
correlations showed no correlation between the total enfacement score and the IAT, 
r(58) = -.05, p = .68, or between the total enfacement score and the prejudice scale, 
r(58) = -.01, p = .93. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 explored whether SMS of the face modulates racial prejudice. 
7KLVZDVLQYHVWLJDWHGE\FRPSDULQJDVWLPXODWLRQFRQGLWLRQLQZKLFKREVHUYHUV¶IDFHV
were stroked in synchrony with a black face, with a neutral stimulation condition, 
whereby neither the observers nor the black onscreen face were stroked. The 
enfacement illusion was measured using an established enfacement questionnaire 
(Maister et al., 2013b; Tajadura-Jiménez, et al., 2012a), while racial prejudice was 
measured implicitly with the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and with the explicit racial 
SUHMXGLFH VFDOH /HSRUH 	 %URZQ  2EVHUYHUV¶ VFRUHV LQ WKH HQIDFHPHQW
questionnaire indicate a persistent subjective enfacement effect after SMS that was 
evident in seven out of eight items. This result supports previous research, by showing 
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that it is possible to enface black faces (Bufalari et al., 2014; Fini et al., 2013). 
However, an effect of SMS on racial prejudice was not found, both when this was 
measured with the IAT and the racial prejudice scale. Thus, SMS did not appear to 
reduce implicit or explicit racial prejudice. These findings converge with previous 
research that has found no effect of SMS on racial prejudice (Farmer et al., 2012), but 
also contrasts with reports of a positive correlation between the total embodiment 
experience and prejudice reduction (Maister et al., 2013a). 
Two possible reasons may explain the absence of racial prejudice modulations 
in our experiment. Firstly, it remains possible that observers represent the onscreen 
PRGHO¶V IHDWXUHV EHWWHU DIWHU V\QFKURQRXV VWLPXODWLRQ WKDQ LQ WKH QHXWUDO FRQGLWLRQ
However, this enhanced representation might not be strong enough to modulate racial 
prejudice. Secondly, it is also possible that SMS is able to modulate racial prejudice 
EXW QHLWKHU RXU LPSOLFLW WKH ,$7 RU H[SOLFLW /HSRUH DQG %URZQ¶V VXEWOH UDFLDO
prejudice scale) measures are sufficiently sensitive to detect such a modulation. In line 
with this reasoning, recent research has questioned the validity of the name-race IAT 
to measure racial prejudice, as the preference toward white names could reflect an 
effect of familiarity toward those names rather than racial prejudice toward black 
people (see van Ravenzwaaij, van der Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2011). To rule out these 




This experiment is identical to Experiment 1, except that the name-race IAT 
was replaced with a face-race version (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 
2000). In this test, the black- and white-associated names are replaced with black and 
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white faces. This IAT cannot be undermined by (lack of) familiarity with the race 
stimuli, as it replaces names by faces (van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011), and should 
therefore provide a more sensitive measure. This face-race IAT explores whether 
observers would show less prejudice toward black people after synchronous 




Thirty new Caucasian students from the University of Kent, with a mean age 
of 19 years (SD = 3.1), participated in this study for course credits or a small payment. 
All observers were female and gave their informed consent for participation. They all 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, excepting for the 
IAT. In this experiment, the face-race IAT was applied (see Dasgupta et al., 2000). 
This particular IAT is comprised of eight white faces and eight black faces and words 
with positive or negative meaning (the same words as in Experiment 1). All face 
images were presented in greyscale format and measured maximally 104 by 138 pixels 
(see Figure 9). As in Experiment 1, observers classified the faces according to their 
ingroup or outgroup status (i.e., white versus black faces) and the words according to 






Figure 9. Representation of the face-race IAT procedure. In the first block (a), observers had to classify 
words as positive or negative. In the second block (b), observers had to classify faces as white or black 
exemplars. In Block 3 (c), observers performed the combined categorization of words and faces. In the 
fourth block (d), as in Block 1, observers classified words as positive or negative, but in this block, they 
keys were reversed. In Block 5 (e), observers performed the combined categorization of words and faces, 





The data for the enfacement questionnaire are provided in Figure 10, as mean 




Figure 10. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the synchronous (black bars) and the 
neutral (grey bars) condition in Experiment 2. Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 10, compared with the neutral condition, SMS 
affected how observers reported to feel about the black face. This effect was such that 
observers were more likely to report that the black face was their own face in the 
synchronous condition than in the neutral condition (items 1, 2 and 3), all ts(29)  2.06, 
ps < .05. Observers also reported feeling a greater resemblance with the black face in 
the synchronous than in the neutral condition (items 4 and 6), both ts(29)  2.72, ps < 
.05. In addition, observers were more likely to report that the experience of their own 
face was less vivid in the synchronous than in the neutral condition (item 7), t(29) = 
2.05, ps < .05. However, an effect of SMS was not always evident, as observers did 
not feel that their face was out of control (item 5), t(29) = 1.50, p = .14, or that they 
were imitating the onscreen face (item 8), t(29) = 1.80, p = .08. Finally, for the overall 
enfacement score, a 2 (stimulation: synchronous vs. neutral) x 2 (block order: 
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synchronous first vs. neutral first) mixed-factor ANOVA showed a main effect of 
stimulation, F(1, 28) = 13.24, p ڦ2p = .32, due to a higher enfacement score in 
the synchronous (M = 27.1, SD = 10.0) than the neutral condition (M = 19.9, SD = 
7.0). The main effect of order and the interaction between order and stimulation were 
not significant, both Fsps !ڦV2p   
 
Racial prejudice measures 
As in Experiment 1, a D score was computed for the IAT. D scores were similar 
across stimulation conditions (synchronous: M = 0.21, SD = 0.27; neutral: M = 0.25, 
SD = 0.28) and block order (synchronous first: M = 0.23, SD = 0.29; neutral first: M 
= 0.44, SD = 0.30). This was confirmed by a 2 (stimulation: synchronous vs. neutral) 
x 2 (block order: synchronous first vs. neutral first) mixed-factor ANOVA, which did 
not show main effects or an interaction, all Fsps ! ڦV2p   
2EVHUYHUV¶VFRUHVZHUHDOVRVLPLODUDFURVVWKHVWLPXODWLRQFRQGLWLRQVV\QFKURQRXV0
= 72, SD = 12; neutral: M = 71, SD = 12, max = 94, min = 51) and block order 
(synchronous first: M = 73, SD = 16; neutral first: M = 70, SD = 17, max = 91, min = 
46) in the subtle racial prejudice questionnaire, which did not show main effects or an 
interaction, all Fsps !ڦV2p   
Finally, it was explored again whether racial prejudice was modulated by the 
subjective feeling of ownership over the black face, regardless of stimulation 
condition. No correlation was found between the total enfacement score and the IAT, 
r(58) = -.06, p = .61, or between the total enfacement score and the prejudice scale, 






Experiment 2 explored further whether SMS of the face modulates racial 
prejudice. In contrast to Experiment 1, the face-race IAT was used (Dasgupta et al., 
2000). This test avoids possible familiarity effects of the name-race IAT test as 
consequence of the bigger experience that people might have with white names (see 
van Ravenzwaaij, 2011). Despite these changes, the main findings of Experiment 1 
were replicated. Thus, observers felt a stronger subjective enfacement illusion after 
synchronous stimulation than in the neutral condition. This effect was such that 
observers felt that the onscreen face was, in fact, their own face. This result supports 
previous research by showing that it is possible to enface black faces (Bufalari et al., 
2014; Fini et al., 2013). As in Experiment 1, however, no effect of either SMS or the 
subjective embodiment experience on implicit or explicit racial prejudice arose. 
Although the face-race IAT in Experiment 2 does not suffer from the 
limitations of the name-face IAT in Experiment 1, it is still possible that this test is not 
sufficiently sensitive to detect differences in racial prejudice between conditions here. 
Both of these IATs compare two complementary categories (i.e. black- and white 
people). Thus, these traditional versions of the IAT (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; 
Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) give a measure of implicit attitudes toward the outgroup 
based on the comparison with the ingroup (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Maister et 
al., 2013a). Such relative measures can create ambiguity in the interpretation of IAT 
scores. For this reason, a third experiment was conducted. In this experiment a single-
category IAT was employed. This test does not include white stimuli, but only 
measures attitudes toward black people (i.e., the outgroup) to provide a more direct 
measure of racial prejudice (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). 
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A further manipulation was added in an attempt to improve the sensitivity of 
the stimulation paradigm. The synchronous and the neutral displays are similar, in the 
sense that the video content of both condition is congruent with observers experience 
(i.e., either synchronous stimulation or no stimulation at all). Consequently, it is 
possible that these conditions are too similar to modulate racial prejudice. To provide 
a stronger contrast, the neutral condition was replaced with an asynchronous 
stimulation condition in Experiment 3. In this condition, observers watched the 
stroking of the onscreen face and also received concurrent tactile stimulation of their 
own face. However, this stimulation was applied with a one-second delay, so that it 
occurred out of synchrony with the onscreen face. A between-subjects design was 
employed to avoid potential confounding effects from receiving both types of 
stimulation (i.e., synchronous and asynchronous). 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 modified the stimulation paradigm and the IAT in a further 
attempt to increase the sensitivity of our measures. In the stimulation task, the neutral 
condition was replaced with an asynchronous stimulation condition, which is a 
common comparison condition for both the rubber hand illusion and the enfacement 
paradigm (see, e.g., Tajadura-Jiménez, et al., 2012a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). In the 
asynchronous condition, observers receive the same tactile stimulation as in the 
synchronous condition, but this is administered with a one-second delay to the 
observed stimulation of the onscreen face. Compared with the synchronous condition, 
the asynchronous condition therefore provides temporal incongruence between what 
observers feel when they are touched and what the touch that they see applied to the 
onscreen model. If this stimulation produces an enfacement effect that also modulates 
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racial prejudice, then observers should show less prejudice toward the modHO¶VHWKQLF
group after synchronous but not asynchronous stimulation. 
In addition, the IAT was also replaced with a single-category version, which 
does not contrast attitudes to the outgroup with the ingroup, but measures attitudes 
toward the outgroup only (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006; Maister et al., 2013a). For 
this reason, the single-FDWHJRU\,$7LVFRQVLGHUHGDPRUHGLUHFWPHDVXUHRIREVHUYHUV¶
attitudes toward black people (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). In contrast to the 
preceding experiments, this IAT was administered on a between-subjects basis, so that 
observers were only exposed to one of the stimulation conditions (i.e., synchronous or 
asynchronous). However, observers now performed single-category IAT twice, prior 
to and after stimulation stage, to determine whether any change in racial prejudice 




Sixty Caucasian students from the University of Kent, with a mean age of = 19 
years (SD= 4.9), participated in the experiment for course credits or a small payment. 
All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Half of these participants were 
allocated to the synchronous and half to the asynchronous stimulation condition. 
 
Stimuli 
This experiment is identical to the preceding experiments, except for the 
following changes. In the stimulation task, the neutral condition was replaced with an 
asynchronous stimulation condition. In this condition, observers always watched the 
same videos as in the synchronous condition, in which the fDFHRIDPRGHOV¶ULJKWFKHHN
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was stroked with a cotton bud every two seconds for two minutes. While watching 
these videos, an identical cotton bud to that seen in the video was used to provide 
VSHFXODUWDFWLOHVWLPXODWLRQWRWKHREVHUYHUV¶FKHHNHLWKHULQtemporal synchrony with 
the onscreen face, in the synchronous condition, or with a temporal offset of one 
second, in the asynchronous condition. To fully accommodate the asynchronous 
condition, two new items were also included in the enfacement questionnaire (see 
items 9 and 10 in Table 1). These items assess the source of the tactile sensation and 
seek to determine the extent to which observers associate the touch of the cotton bud 
on their own face with that of the onscreen face. 
In addition, the standard IAT was replaced with a single-category version. As 
in the preceding experiments, this IAT is comprised of words and faces but only black 
faces are included. Observers have to categorize words as either positive or negative 
and black faces as black, using HLWKHU WKH µ]¶ RU µP¶ NH\V RQ D VWDQGDUG FRPSXWHU
keyboard. The task consisted of two different blocks. In one block, positive words and 
black faces shared the same response key, whereas, in the other block, negative words 
and black faces shared a response. Each of these block contained 24 practice trials and 
72 experimental trials (for further details, see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Response 
keys assigned to positive and negative words categories were fully counterbalanced.  
 
Procedure 
In the experiment, observers began by performing the single-category IAT and the 
score of this test was used as a baseline measure of racial prejudice. This IAT consisted 
of two different stages, each containing 24 practice trials and 72 experimental trials. In 
one stage, positive words and black faces were assigned to the same response key, 
whereas, in the other stage, negative words and black faces shared the same response. 
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Each stage started with a set of instructions about the categorization task and the keys 
assigned for each option. Each target picture or word was displayed in the centre of the 
screen. The target word remained on the screen until the observers responded or for 
PV,IREVHUYHUVGLGQRWUHVSRQGDPHVVDJH³SOHDVHUHVSRQGPRUHTXLFNO\´
appeared for 500 ms.  
Synchronous or asynchronous stimulation was then administered by stroking 
REVHUYHUV¶IDFHVZLWKDFRWWRQEXGDWWZR-second intervals, while they watched a video 
of a black female being stroked at the same rate. In the synchronous, this stimulation 
was administered in time with the onscreen face. In the asynchronous condition, the 
tactile stimulation of the observer and the onscreen face was offset by one second. The 
allocation of observers to these conditions was randomized. After the stimulation stage, 




Observers were more likely to report that the onscreen black face was their own 
in the synchronous than the asynchronous condition (see items 1, 2 and 3 in Figure 11), 
all ts(58)  3.13, ps < .01. Observers were also more likely to report that their face was 
out of control in the synchronous than the asynchronous condition (item 5), t(58) = 
2.25, p < .05. In addition, observers were more likely to feel that they were imitating 
the black face in the synchronous condition (item 8), t(58) = 2.88, p < .01, and that the 
cotton bud stroking their own face and the cotton bud stroking the black face were the 
same (items 9 and 10), both ts(58)  2.52, ps < .05. However, despite the clear 
convergence in felt UHVHPEODQFHEHWZHHQREVHUYHUV¶RZQDQGWKHRQVFUHHQIDFHWKH\
did not report that these faces actually began to resemble each other (items 4 and 6), 
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both ts(58)  1.89, ps > .07. In addition, observers also did not report that the 
experience of their own face was less vivid than normal (item 7), t(58) = 1.93, p = .07. 
Finally, the overall enfacement effect, by combining scores across each item, was 
stronger in the synchronous (M = 33.6, SD = 11.9) than in the asynchronous condition 
(M = 23.2, SD = 9.0), t(58) = 3.81, p < .01. 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the synchronous (black bars) and the 
neutral (grey bars) condition in Experiment 3. Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
Racial prejudice measures 
The scores for the single category IAT were analysed according to Karpinski 
and Steinman (2006). This adapted D score for the single category IAT is calculated 
by subtracting the average response times when black faces shared the same key with 
negative words from the average response times when black faces shared the same key 
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with positive words. This quantity is then divided by the standard deviation of all the 
correct responses in the experimental trials (for further details, see Karpinski & 
Steinman, 2006). Thus, a positive score reflects a positive attitude toward black people. 
Scores in the single category IAT were similar for the synchronous (pre-test, M = -.06, 
SD = .18; post-test, M = -.01, SD = .14) and the asynchronous (pre-test, M = -.04, SD 
= .18; post-test, M = -.02, SD = .11) conditions. This was confirmed by a 2 x 2 ANOVA 
with the within-subjects factor time (pre-test vs. post-test) and the between-subject 
factor condition (synchronous vs. asynchronous). This showed neither a main effect of 
time, F(1,58) = 1.50, p  ڦ2p = .02, or condition, F(1,58) = 0.02, p  ڦ2p  < .01, 
and no interaction between factors, F(1,58) = 0.19, p  ڦ2p < .01. 
7RH[SORUHZKHWKHUUDFLDOSUHMXGLFHZDVPRGXODWHGE\REVHUYHUV¶IHHOLQJVRI
ownership over the black face, Pearson correlations were also conducted between the 
total enfacement score and the score in the post-test single category IAT. This 
correlation was not significant, r(58) = .17, p = .18. 
 
Discussion 
This experiment explored whether SMS of the face modulates racial prejudice 
E\FRPSDULQJV\QFKURQRXVZLWKDV\QFKURQRXVVWLPXODWLRQRIREVHUYHUV¶IDFHV%HIRUH
and after the stimulation, observers performed the single category IAT, to provide an 
implicit measure of their attitudes toward black faces. As in previous experiments, 
observers reported a stronger subjective enfacement illusion in the synchronous 
condition. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, which compared synchronous 
stimulation with a neutral condition, in which no stroking was administered to the 
onscreen face or the observers, this effect was now found by comparing synchronous 
with temporally asynchronous stimulation. This effect was such that observers were 
69 
 
more likely to report that the onscreen face was, in fact, their own face. Despite this 
clear multisensory stimulation effect, we once again did not find any effect of SMS on 
in racial prejudice. This replicates the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
General discussion 
This study investigated whether multisensory stimulation of a white observer 
with a black face produces an enfacement effect that can reduce racial prejudice. In 
Experiment 1, participants were exposed to multisensory stimulation, whereby their 
own face was stroked in synchrony with an observed black face. This was compared 
with a neutral condition, in which no tactile stimulation was delivered. Racial prejudice 
was measured implicitly, with the name-race IAT (e.g., Hall et al., 2009), and 
explicitly, with the subtle prejudice questionnaire (Lepore & Brown, 1996). After 
synchronous stimulation, observers were more likely to feel that the onscreen black 
IDFHµZDV¶WKHLURZQIDFHDQGµEHORQJHG¶WRWKHP than after the neutral condition. This 
effect was consistently found, across 7 of the 8 items on the enfacement questionnaire. 
However, this change in the onscreen face ownership experience was not accompanied 
by a modulation of racial prejudice, both on the implicit and explicit measures. 
Further experiments explored whether the stimulation paradigm and the racial 
prejudice measures can be modified to improve the sensitivity of this approach. In 
Experiment 2 the name-face IAT of Experiment 1 was replaced with a face-race 
version (Dasgupta et al., 2000), which removes possible familiarity confounds. For 
example, it is possible that the name-race IAT does not measure racial prejudice if 
observers cannot attribute ethnic origin accurately to the name stimuli (see van 
Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011). Despite this change, Experiment 2 replicated the main 
findings. Thus, observers exhibited a stronger enfacement effect after synchronous 
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stimulation compared to neutral stimulation, but this did not affect implicit or explicit 
racial prejudice. Finally, Experiment 3 also compared synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation and employed a single category IAT to provide a more specific measure of 
racial prejudice attitudes against an outgroup (see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Once 
again, observers were more likely to feel that the black onscreen face was their own 
after synchronous stimulation, but this did not reduce racial prejudice. 
The findings of this study converge with previous research, by showing that it 
is possible to embody physical features of an outgroup member, such as a black hand 
(Maister et al., 2013a) or black faces (Fini et al., 2013; Bufalari et al., 2014). In contrast 
to previous work, however, a positive effect of SMS of the face on prejudice reduction 
was not found. For example, a recent study has shown that after enfacing a black face, 
observers displayed an increased visual remapping of touch effect (i.e., the tactile 
sensitivity caused by watching another person being touched) toward that black face 
up to the level normally associated with ingroup members (Fini et al., 2013). This could 
suggest a reduction of racial prejudice after the SMS of the face. However, as the visual 
remapping of touch effect was measured exclusively for the enfaced face, it is also 
possible that this effect reflects an increase of positive attitudes toward the enfaced 
face, but not more generally toward its race. This explanation would be consistent with 
the finding that SMS produces a positive affective reaction toward an enfaced face 
(e.g., Paladino et al., 2010). 
The current experiments also indicate that the feeling of ownership experience 
over an enfaced black face does not modulate racial prejudice. There is evidence that 
WKHLQWHQVLW\OHYHORIREVHUYHUV¶LOOXVLRQRIRZQHUVKLSRYHUDQHQIDFHGEODFNVWLPXOXV
relates to their racial prejudice (see Maister et al., 2013a). In contrast to the current 
experiments, however, this effect was observed with hands. Faces are more distinctive 
71 
 
physical features and are important not only for recognizing others but also for self-
recognition. Moreover, whereas several neuropsychological studies have reported 
denial of ownership over hands or feet in brain-damaged patients (see, e.g., Berlucchi 
& Aglioti, 1997; Giummarra, Gibson, Georgiou-Karistianis, & Bradshaw, 2008), 
deficits in self-face recognition appear to be less frequent and are, in most of the cases, 
WUDQVLHQWVHH%UpGDUW	<RXQJ7KLVUDLVHVWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWRWKHUSHRSOHV¶
faces are more difficult to embody than other body parts, such as hands. In line with 
this reasoning, phenomenological evidence from Experiments 1, 2 and 3, and from 
other studies (e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012b) suggests that the effect of SMS of the face, although significant 
when compared with both the asynchronous and neutral stimulation, it was small in 
absolute terms7KLVLVVXFKWKDWREVHUYHUV¶UHVSRQVHVLQWKHHQIDFHPHQWTXHVWLRQQDLUH
were generally below the mid-point of the Likert scale. On the contrary, the 
phenomenological effect of SMS on the rubber hand illusions is not only greater when 
FRPSDUHG ZLWK ERWK DV\QFKURQRXV DQG QHXWUDO FRQGLWLRQV EXW DOVR REVHUYHUV¶
responses are, generally, above the mid-point of the scale (see, e.g., Longo et al., 2008). 
This shows that the enfacement illusion is less vivid than other body illusions 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Lenggenhager et a., 2007; Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris & 
Haggard, 2005).   
From a cognitive perspective, these differences between findings could indicate 
that the rubber hand and enfacement illusions reflect different aspects of self-identity. 
Psychometric studies have found a self-identification component in the rubber illusion 
and the enfacement illusion (see Longo,et al., 2008; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). 
However, this component seems to differ in its structure in both illusions. In the case 
of the rubber hand illusion, this component is constituted of the subcomponents 
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ownership (i.e., the feeling that the rubber hand was part of the body), location (i.e., 
the feeling that the rubber hand was in the same place as the own hand), and agency 
(i.e., the feeling of being able to move the rubber hand; see Longo et al., 2008). In the 
case of the enfacement illusion, on the other hand, no subcomponents for self-
identification were found (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). It has been proposed that 
this reflects the different importance that faces and hands have for self-identity, which 
should be stronger for faces (see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). This could also 
explain why the rubber-hand illusion can modulate racial prejudice (Maister et al., 
2013a), but the enfacement illusion does not. 
In the current experiments, we had sought to investigate the effect of SMS on 
racial prejudice because it blurs self-other boundaries by reducing the difference with 
the enfaced face (see Paladino et al., 2010). The finding that this manipulation does 
not affect racial prejudice contrasts with other procedures that seem to rely on a similar 
mechanism of differences reduction for prejudice reduction (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000 for review), such as intergroup contact, shared attribute generation (Hall et a., 
2009) and behavioural mimicry (e.g., Inzlicht et al., 2012; Tuner & Crisp, 2010). 
Therefore, the question arises why SMS is unable to modulate racial prejudice, when 
other methods of differences reduction do. 
2QHSRVVLELOLW\LVWKDWREVHUYHUV¶SUHMXGLFHZDVDOUHDG\ORZLHDWIORRUOHYHO
at the start of the current experiments and therefore could not be susceptible to the 
FXUUHQWPDQLSXODWLRQ$FURVVWKHWKUHHH[SHULPHQWVREVHUYHUV¶VFRUHVIHOOMXVWDERYH
the midpoint of the IAT scale (e.g., at ~ 0.4 in Experiment 1, with the scale ranging 
from -2 to +2). Thus, these scores rule out a floor (or ceiling) effect and indicate some 
prejudice toward the outgroup (i.e., black people). Previous studies have successfully 
modulated racial prejudice on the IAT with other manipulations despite reporting 
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similar baseline scores (see, e.g., Hall et al., 2009; Maister et al., 2013a; Peck, Seinfeld, 
Aglioti, & Slater, 2013). This indicates that we did not fail to obtain an enfacement 
PRGXODWLRQEHFDXVHREVHUYHUV¶UDFLDOSUHMXGLFHZDVWRRORZ 
Alternatively, it might be possible that the enfacement effect is able to modulate 
complex processes such as self-face recognition (Tskiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010; 
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a) and social cognition processes (Paladino et al., 2010), 
but the mechanism involved in the enfacement illusion would be unable to modulate 
racial prejudice. For example, such differences could be found if observers can switch 
their perspective to that of the model during enfacement but, conversely, are unable to 
DGDSW WKHPRGHO¶VSHUVSHFWLYH VHH3HWNRYDHW DO  ,QRWKHr words, observers 
might tend to perceive the onscreen face as more similar to their own, but not the 
opposite (see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). As a consequence, modulation in racial 
prejudice is not produced because observers perceive the model as more similar to 
themselves (e.g., as more white in the current experiments), but because they do not 
perceive themselves as more similar to the model (e.g., as black, see Tajadura-Jiménez 
et al., 2012a; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). In the current experiments, the responses 
of the enfacement questionnaire cannot distinguish these possibilities (see items 6 and 
7 in Table 1). However, behavioural evidence from other research programmes has 
shown that observers indeed perceive an enfaced face as more similar to the own face, 
but not vice versa (see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). 
This appears to be a critical difference to other manipulations which decrease 
racial prejudice, such as behavioural mimicry (Inzlicht et al., 2012), shared attribute 
generation (Hall et al., 2009), or intergroup contact (Tuner & Crisp, 2010). In these 
SURFHGXUHVREVHUYHUVPXVWWDNHWKHPRGHO¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDQGVKRXOGWKHUHIRUH³ORRN´
more like the model. In the case of behavioural mimicry, for example, observers have 
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to copy a model¶VDFWLRQ7KHFXUUHQWILQGLQJVDOVRVXJJHVWWKDWVXFKSHUVSHFWLYH-taking 










Can gaze-contingent mirror-feedback 










Despite the absence of an effect of SMS on racial prejudice, a clear enfacement 
effect was obtained in all experiments in Chapter 2. This converges with previous 
research to suggest that SMS of the face is a remarkably robust effect in self-face 
recognition (e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). 
However, the enfacement paradigm relies on observing the tactile stimulation of 
another person, which is a scenario that is not encountered outside of the laboratory. 
Chapter 3 therefore examined ZKHWKHU D VLPLODU XSGDWLQJ RI REVHUYHUV¶ IDFLDO
representations occurs with a stimulation method that is more similar to the experience 
RIVWXG\LQJRQH¶VRZQUHIOHFWLRQLQDPLUURU 
Recognition requires that a seen face is matched to a stored, internal 
representation of that identity. Theories of face processing postulate that this internal 
representation is not tied to a specific instance of a seen face, but is activated by any 
image of this person (see, e.g., Burton et al., 1990; Bruce & Young, 1986). Thus, this 
internal representation should be tolerant to changes in the appearance of a face, such 
as variation in lighting direction or facial pose (see, e.g., Bruce, 1982; Longmore et al, 
2008). A question that arises is how this internal representation is created so that a 
previously unfamiliar face, of someone that we have not met before, becomes 
sufficiently familiar for recognition to occur. 
Current theories suggest that one way to operationalize this process could be 
the creation of face averages, in which different instances of the same face are 
integrated into a single representation (Burton et al., 2005). In this process, information 
that is relevant to the identity of a person, and therefore present consistently across 
encounters, is combined to form a robust facial representation for recognition. By 
contrast, variable visual information that is irrelevant to identity, such as superficial 
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changes in the appearance of a particular face, is eliminated naturally during averaging 
because their effect will be cancelled out across different instances. 
This theoretical account can provide a robust method to simulate face 
recognition (Burton et al., 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2008; Robertson et al, 2015). It 
also provides an account of face learning (see e.g., Burton et al., in press; Kramer et 
al., 2015; Leib et al., 2014). Accordingly, the created internal representation of a face 
is tied in an additive manner to the experience of that identity, whereby every new 
exposure strengthens its average and leads to a stronger internal representation (Burton 
et al., 2005, 2011; Jenkins & Burton, 2008). Interestingly, this theoretical approach can 
also explain two interrelated aspects of self-recognition, namely how a visual 
representation of the own face is created and how this representation accommodates 
changes in physical appearance during the lifespan. According to this perspective, any 
new instance of the own face would be incorporated into the averaging process to 
naturally deal with changes in the appearance. 
However, current theories stop short of explaining an important component of 
self-recognition, namely the self-referential process of knowing that a particular face 
LVLQIDFWRQH¶VRZQHJ'HYXH	%UHGDUW0RULQ$SRWHQWLDODQVZHU
to this question emerges from the domain of body perception, where research has 
shown the importance of body-awareness for self-recognition (e.g., Botvinick & 
Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Mental representations of 
our bodies are held to be created through the interaction and integration of different 
senses, such as visual, tactile and proprioceptive information (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, 
& Seeck, 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). This information appears to be used not 
only in the formation of a representation of our body, but also for updating and 
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modifying that representation when necessary (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova et al., 2011; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Evidence for such accounts comes from the rubber hand illusion. In this 
paradigm, observers watch a rubber-hand being stroked while their own hand is stroked 
out of sight in synchrony. This simultaneous stimulation produces the feeling that the 
UXEEHUKDQGLVLQIDFWRQH¶VRZQKDQG%RWYLQLFN	&RKHQ7VDNLULV	+DJJDUG
2005). This effect relies on the multi-sensory combination of touch (of onH¶VRZQKDQG
and sight (of the rubber hand being stroked). However, a rubber-hand effect has also 
been obtained without touching, for example, when there is synchrony of movement 
between a rubber hand DQGRQH¶Vown hand (e.g., Dummer et al., 2009; Riemer et al., 
2014). Similar effects have been reported with arms (Guterstamet al.,, 2011) and even 
with the whole body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova et 
al., 2011). 
With respect to face learning, these findings are interesting in that they could 
provide a self-referential process to update internal representations. Accordingly, such 
updating could be supported if observers can see and, through proprioceptive feedback, 
feel their own face move at the same time. Outside of the laboratory, such feedback is 
available daily from mirrors, for example, during hygiene activities such as washing 
DQGJURRPLQJ,QWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVDSHUVRQ¶VPLUURUUHIOHFWLRQSURYLGHVV\QFKURQRXs 
visual feedback for motor, proprioceptive and tactile information (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Tajadura-Jimenez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008, 2010). This feedback provides 
direct evidence that a looked-DW IDFH LV LQ IDFW RQH¶V RZQ 7KH TXHVWLRQ DULVHV RI 
whether this contributes to the updating RIDSHUVRQ¶VIDFLDOSUHVHQWDWLRQ 




that consists of a 50:50 morph of their own face and that of another person, they 
VXEVHTXHQWO\WHQGWRVHHPRUHRIWKHLURZQIHDWXUHVLQWKHRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VIDFH7VDNLULV
2008). This perceptual effect is accompanied by a subjective illusion that the other face 
belongs to the observer. This bias in self-UHFRJQLWLRQRU³HQIDFHPHQWHIIHFW´6IRU]D et 
al., 2010) has been shown with totally unfamiliar (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a), 
familiar (Sforza et al., 2010) and other-race faces (Bufalari et al., 2014; Fini et al., 
2013). 
While these findings point to a remarkably robust effect, multi-sensory 
paradigms rely on observing the tactile stimulation of another agent. This presents a 
scenario that is not encountered outside of the laboratory. In this study, we therefore 
wish to H[DPLQHZKHWKHUDVLPLODUXSGDWLQJRIREVHUYHUV¶IDFLDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRFFXUV
ZLWKDVWLPXODWLRQPHWKRGWKDWLVPRUHVLPLODUWRWKHH[SHULHQFHRIVWXG\LQJRQH¶VRZQ
reflection in a mirror. For this purpose, we present a novel gaze-contingent paradigm, 
in which the eye movements of a face on a computer screen directly mimic the looking 
behaviour of an observer. 
To measure the effect of this manipulation in self-recognition, we compared 
several conditions. In Experiment 4, the gaze behaviour of the onscreen face provided 
D GLUHFW ³PLUURU-UHIOHFWLRQ´ IRU REVHUYHUV¶ JD]H EHKDYLRXU E\ PLPLFNLQJ WKHLU H\H
movements in the congruent condition. This was contrasted with an incongruent 
condition in which the eyes of the onscreen face responded to observers eye-gaze but 
moved in a different direction. If mirror-reflection is used to update facial 
representations of the own face, then it should be possible to induce an enfacement-
type effect in this paradigm. In line with studies of multi-sensory stimulation (e.g., Fini 
et al., 2013; Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008), this 
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effect should be found in the congruent gaze condition in comparison with incongruent 
displays. 
To assess this possibility, we adopted established measures of the enfacement 
illusion from multi-sensory stimulation paradigms (see, e.g., Keenan et al., 1999; 
Maister et al., 2013; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). This comprised a 
self-other discrimination task, in which observers were shown a morphing sequence 
EHWZHHQWKHIDFHYLHZHGLQWKHVWLPXODWLRQVWDJHDQGREVHUYHUV¶RZQIDFH,QWKLVWDVN
observers were asked to determine at which point they could perceive their own face 
in the sequence. This measure was complemented with an enfacement questionnaire, 
ZKLFK DVVHVVHG GLIIHUHQW DVSHFWV RI REVHUYHUV¶ SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO H[SHULHQFH RI
identifying with the face of the stimulation stage. 
 
Experiment 4 
In this experiment, observers watched an onscreen stimulation face in a gaze-
contingent paradigm, which comprised of two conditions. In the congruent condition, 
WKH H\HV RI WKLV IDFH PLPLFNHG REVHUYHUV¶ H\H-gaze direction to imitate, in this 
particular aspect, the experience of looking in a mirror. Observers triggered the eye-
gaze of the onscreen face by moving their own eyes, which were tracked concurrently, 
around the display screen. To encourage such eye movements, the onscreen face was 
surrounded by eight boxes, which, upon fixated, revealed a visual icon. Performance 
in this task was contrasted with an incongruent condition, in which the eyes of the 
onscreen face moved in temporal synchrony with an observer eye-gaze but in a 
different direction. 
Before and after this task, observers performed a self-other discrimination task. 
This consisted of a morphing sequence between the onscreen face from the stimulation 
81 
 
VWDJHDQGREVHUYHU¶VRZQIDFH7KLVVHTXHQFHDOZD\VEHJDn with the onscreen face, 
ZKLFKZDVJUDGXDOO\PRUSKHGLQWRWKHREVHUYHU¶VRZQIDFH2EVHUYHUVKDGWRVWRSWKLV
sequence as soon as they felt that the face resembled their own face more than that of 
WKHVWLPXODWLRQIDFH,QDGGLWLRQREVHUYHUV¶SKHQRPHQRORJical experience of the gaze-
contingent task was also assessed with an established enfacement questionnaire. 
 If this gaze-contingent mirror-reflection paradigm can be used to update 
REVHUYHUV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI WKHLURZQIDFH WKHQ WKHRQVFUHHQIDFHVKRXOd become 
integrated into this representation in the congruent condition. As a consequence, 
observers should detect their own face earlier in the morphing sequence in the 
congruent than in the incongruent condition. This effect should also be evident from 
the questionnaire, with observers reporting a greater resemblance with the stimulation 




Twenty Caucasian students (13 females) from the University of Kent, with a 
mean age of 22 years (SD = 4.2), participated in this study. All provided informed 
consent prior to taking part and received course credits or a small fee for participation. 
All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli 
Gaze-contingent stimulation displays 
For the stimuli of the gaze-contingent task, a male and a female frontal face 
were taken from the Glasgow Face Database (Burton et al., 2010). These faces were 
digitized with FaceGen Modeller software (Singular inversions Inc., Toronto). The 
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resulting faces provided artificial representations of the original stimuli, in which gaze 
direction can be controlled with the same software. This was used to create nine images 
of each face, in which the eye-gaze systematically varied across three horizontal (left, 
middle, right) and three vertical positions (up, middle, down). To enhance the salience 
of these gaze directions, the brightness of the sclera was increased by 25% using Adobe 
Photoshop. 
In the experiment, each of these faces was presented at a width and height of 
325 x 420 pixels at a screen resolution of 72 ppi in the centre of a white display. These 
faces were surrounded by eight boxes, which measured 220 x 220 pixels. When fixated, 
these boxes were replaced by images of objects (e.g., a radio, cd, glove), which 
measured maximally 200 x 200 pixels. These displays are illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12. Example stimuli of the congruent condition for Experiment 4 and 5, showing direct eye-gaze 
(left panel) and the eyes pointing up (centre) or down (right). In the neutral condition, the eye-gaze 
remained direct and static throughout. In the incongruent condition, the eyes of the onscreen face pointed 
LQDGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWLRQWRREVHUYHUV¶RZQH\H-gaze, and therefore did not point at the revealed object. 
 
Self-other discrimination task 
For the self-other discrimination task, a digital photograph of each observer 
ZDVWDNHQSULRUWKHH[SHULPHQW)RUFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKWKHPRGHO¶VIDFHWKHVHSLFWXUHV
were also modelled with FaceGen. The digitalized images were morphed with the 
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VWLPXODWLRQ IDFH WKDW PDWFKHG WKH REVHUYHU¶V VH[ LQ  VWHSV XVLQJ )DQWDPRUSK
(Abrasoft) software. This resulted in a sequence of 100 images, which provided a 
VPRRWKFRQWLQXXPEHWZHHQWKHVWLPXODWLRQIDFHDQGDQREVHUYHU¶VRZQ face. Each of 
these images was presented at a size of 254 x 313 pixels at a screen resolution of 72 
ppi. 
A pilot experiment was conducted to assess the similarity of the digitalized 
faces with each of the corresponding observers in Experiment 4, 5 and 6. Eight 
independent participants were presented with pairs of faces depicting the internal 
features of the digitalized face DQGWKHDFWXDOREVHUYHU¶s picture. Participants had to 
perform two different tasks. Firstly, they rated the resemblance between both images 
on a 10-SRLQW/LNHUWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP³QRUHVHPEODQFH´WR³VWURQJUHVHPEODQFH´
Mean resemblance rating for all the pair of faces was 8.3 (SD: 1.2; minimum rating: 7; 
maximum rating: 10), which indicates that the digitalized version and the actual picture 
were highly similar. Secondly, participants had to indicate which of the picture the 
digitalized version was, but they also had the option to skip to the next pair of pictures 
if they were not sure. In total, participants skip 94% of the trials, which indicates that 





the gaze-contingent paradigm. This questionnaire was adapted from studies of the 
³HQIDFHPHQW´HIIHFW7DMDGXUD-Jiménez et al., 2012a; see also Maister et al., 2013) and 
consisted of 11 items (see Table 2).  
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7KH ILUVW VHYHQ TXHVWLRQV DVVHVVHG REVHUYHUV¶ enfacement experience and 
LQFOXGHGLWHPVVXFKDV³,IHOWOLNHWKHRQVFUHHQIDFHZDVP\IDFH´DQG³,IHOWOLNH,ZDV
ORRNLQJ DW P\ RZQ IDFH LQ WKH PLUURU´ $ KLJK VFRUH LQ WKHVH LWHPV LQGLFDWHV WKDW
observers felt that the onscreen face had become integrated with the internal 
representation of their own face during the experiment (see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 
2012b). The four remaining items assessed whether observers perceived the eye-gaze 
RIWKHVWLPXODWLRQIDFHVXFKDV³,IHOWOLNHWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH¶VH\HVIROORZHGP\H\HV´
to provide a manipulation check. Responses to all items were recorded on 7-point 
Likert scales, which ranged from ³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´ WR³VWURQJO\DJUHH´. 
 
Type of Item Enfacement Item 
Enfacement 1. I felt like the onscreen face was my face 
 
2. I felt like the onscreen face belonged to me 
 
3. I felt like I was looking at my own face reflected in a mirror 
 
4. I felt like my own face was out of my control 
 
5. I felt like my face began to resemble the onscreen face 
 




Verification 8. ,IHOWOLNHWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH¶VH\HVIROORZHGP\H\HV 
 
9. ,IHOWOLNHLI,KDGPRYHGP\H\HVWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH¶VH\HVZRXOG











In the experiment, observers participated in the self-other discrimination task 
first to obtain a baseline measure of self-recognition (the pre-test), which was 
conducted using E-SULPH RQ D FRPSXWHU ZLWK D ´ VFUHHQ ,Q WKLV WDVN REVHUYHUV
viewed the sequence of the morphed faces. This sequence always began with the 
stimulation face (100% stimulation face, 0% observer), which was gradually morphed, 
LQVHJPHQWVLQWRDQREVHUYHU¶VRZQIDFH7KLVVHTXHQFHZDVSUHVHQWHGDWDUDWHRI
one segment per second. While watching this sequence, observers were asked to press 
the space bar as soon as they felt that the displayed face resembled their own more than 
that of the stimulation face. Prior to this pre-test, observers were trained on this 
discrimination task by watching a sequence that morphed the face of David Cameron 
(British Prime Minister) into Barack Obama (American President). 
The pre-test was followed by the gaze-contingent stimulation task. For this 
WDVNREVHUYHUV¶ H\HPRYHPHQWVZHUH WUDFNHGXVLQJ WKH65-Research Eyelink 1000 
desk-PRXQWHGH\HWUDFNLQJV\VWHP2EVHUYHUVVDWDWDGLVWDQFHRIFPIURPD´
screen, which was held constant by a chinrest. Although viewing was binocular, only 
the left eye was tracked. To calibrate eye-gaze, the standard nine-point Eyelink 
procedure was used. Thus, observers fixated a set of nine fixations targets, which was 
followed by a second sequence of nine targets to validate calibration. If this procedure 
indicated poor measurement accuracy (i.e., a measurement error of > 1° of visual 
angle), calibration was repeated. 
At the beginning of the stimulation task, observers fixated a central dot so that 
an automatic drift correction could be performed. The stimulation face was then 
displayed in the centre of the screen. The sex of this was always kept congruent with 
that of the observer. The stimulation face was surrounded by eight boxes, which were 
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depicted in different colours (see Figure 12). Each of these boxes hid an object, which 
was revealed when it was fixated by the observers, to provide a task demand that would 
encourage eye movements around these displays. Observers were asked to look at these 
boxes and to memorize their contents. Crucially, the onscreen location of these boxes 
served as trigger regions to manipulate the eye-gaze of the stimulation face. Observers 
received either congruent or incongruent stimulation. In the congruent condition, the 
RQVFUHHQIDFH¶VJD]HFKDQJHGRQO\PV after a trigger region was fixated to follow 
WKHREVHUYHU¶VJD]H In the incongruent condition the gaze of the stimulation face was 
DOZD\VLQFRQJUXHQWZLWKREVHUYHUV¶RZQH\H-gaze direction. This spatial incongruence 
was created by randomly assigning a different gaze direction to the stimulation face 
IRUHDFKRIWKHREVHUYHU¶VSRVVLEOHJD]HGLUHFWLRQV 
This task lasted for two minutes and, to assess any effects of this stimulation 
on self-recognition, was followed by a repetition of the self-other discrimination task 
and the enfacement questionnaire. Observers were then presented with a second block 
of the stimulation task, but they received different stimulation to that received in the 
first block (i.e., if the stimulation was congruent in the first block, it was incongruent 
in the second block). This was followed by a further repetition of the discrimination 
task and the questionnaire. Over the course of the experiment, the presentation order 
of the congruent and incongruent conditions was counterbalanced across observers. 
 
Results 
Self-other discrimination task 




own face in the morphing sequence. This data is given for the baseline measure and 
after the gaze-congruent and incongruent stimulation conditions were administered.  
A one-factor ANOVA (baseline, congruent, incongruent condition) of this data 
showed a main effect of condition, F(1,19) = 7.13, p Șp2 = .27. Paired sample t-
tests (Bonferroni-corrected) revealed that observers perceived their own face earlier in 
the morphing sequence after the application of the gaze-congruent condition in 
comparison with the baseline, t(19) = 2.80, p < .05. However, a similar effect was 
observed also in the incongruent condition in comparison to baseline, t(19) = 3.44, p 
< .01, and the congruent and incongruent condition did not differ from each other, t(19) 
= 0.50, p = .98. Taken together, these results suggest a practice effect as observers 
perceived their own face earlier in both the congruent and incongruent conditions 
compared with the baseline. 
 
 
Figure 13. Performance in the self-other discrimination task in Experiment 4, expressed as the number 
of frames that observers judged to show their own face or that of the onscreen face, for the baseline 





The self-other discrimination task indicates that the gaze-contingent paradigm 
GLGQRWDIIHFWREVHUYHUV¶SHUFHSWXDOVHOI-UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV:HDOVRDVVHVVHGREVHUYHUV¶
questionnaire responses to determine if this paradigm affected how they felt regarding 
the stimulation face. These data are provided in Figure 14, as mean Likert responses 
to each of the enfacement items, for the congruent and incongruent conditions. Four of 
the questionnaire items are verification items, which assess whether observers were 
sensitive to the gaze-contingent task. The differences in ratings for these verification 
items show that observers were aware that the onscreen face followed their own eye-
gaze in the congruent compared to the incongruent condition (items 8 and 9), both 
ts(19)  4.00, ps < .001. The ratings also show a clear difference between conditions 
in terms of the directionality of the eye-gaze (items 10 and 11), whereby observers 
were more likely to report that the eyes of the stimulation face moved in the same 
direction as their own eyes in the congruent condition, t(19) = 7.28, p < .001. In 
contrast, observers noted that the eyes of the stimulation face moved in a different 
direction to their own in incongruent displays, t(19) = 5.98, p < .001. However, when 
the ratings for items 10 (eyes moved in the same direction) and 11 (eyes moved in a 
different direction) are compared directly, it emerges that these are more similar in the 
incongruent condition, t(19) = 1.60, p = .12, than the congruent condition, t(19)  
15.79, p < .001. This suggests that observers always perceived movement of the 
VWLPXODWLRQIDFH¶VH\HVEXWZHUHOHVVVHQVLWLYHWRWKHdirection of these movements in 
the incongruent condition. 
A comparison of the congruent and the incongruent condition also shows that 
the gaze contingent paradigm did not affect obserYHUV¶ IHHOLQJV DERXW WKH RQVFUHHQ
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face, which were comparable across these conditions in all enfacement questions 
(items 1-7), all ts(19)  1.65, ps >.07. An overall enfacement score, which was also 
calculated by summing the scores for items 1 to 7 also shows that the congruent (M = 
20.4, SD = 8.2) and incongruent (M = 17.9, SD = 9.1) conditions did not differ, t(19) 
= 1.14, p = .14. 
 
 
Figure 14. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the congruent (black bars) and the 
incongruent (grey bars) conditions in Experiment 4. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
Discussion  
Experiment 4 explored whether it would be possible to update the internal 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQIDFHZLWKDJD]H-contingent paradigm that simulates the 
mirror-reflection experience. This was investigated by comparing a congruent 
condition, in which the eye-gaze of an onscreen face follows that of the observer, with 
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an incongruent condition, in which the gaze of the onscreen face was spatially 
LQFRQJUXHQW ZLWK REVHUYHUV 7R DVVHVV ZKHWKHU WKLV VWLPXODWLRQ DIIHFWHG REVHUYHUV¶
self-representation, they were asked to detect their face in an image sequence that 
began with the onscreen face and gradually morphed into their own face. In comparison 
with a baseline measure, which was obtained prior to the administration of the 
stimulation task, a shift in self-recognition was found in the congruent condition, 
whereby observers recognized their own face at an earlier stage of the morphing 
sequence. However, the same effect was also observed after the administration of an 
incongruent condition. Taken together, these results suggest that the gaze-congruent 
FRQGLWLRQGLGQRWDIIHFWREVHUYHUV¶VHOI-recognition per se. Instead, these findings hint 
at a practice effect whereby observers perceived their own face earlier in the morphing 
sequence of the congruent and incongruent conditions in comparison to the initial 
measure at baseline. In line with these findings, the results indicate also that the mirror-
like gaze-contingent paradigm did not affect how observers feel about the onscreen 
face and their own face. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that the difference in eye-gaze 
between the congruent and incongruent conditions was insufficient to elicit a mirror 
effect and affect self-recognition. The verification items of the questionnaire reveal 
that observers were sensitive to the eye movements of the stimulation face in the 
congruent condition. However, this effect was considerably smaller with incongruent 
displays. Here, observers showed some false agreement that the stimulation face 
followed their eyes (see item 8 in Figure 14), and a direct comparison of items 10 and 




This situation might arise because eye-gaze direction cannot be perceived 
easily outside the focus of attention (Burton, Bindemann, Langton, Schweinberger, & 
Jenkins, 2009). In the current paradigm, observers have to explore the boxes 
surrounding the stimulation face to trigger its eye movements. As a result of this, 
however, this face is unattended when any changes in its gaze direction occur. If 
observers have limited awareness of these changes, then this cannot produce the 
mirror-type effects that might be required to affect self-recognition. To explore this 
possibility, we conducted a further experiment in which the incongruent condition was 
replaced with a neutral display, in which the eyes of the onscreen face looked straight 
DKHDG UHJDUGOHVVRI WKHREVHUYHUV¶JD]HEHKDYLRXU6XFKGLUHFWJD]H LVPRUHVDOLHQW
than averted gaze outside the focus of attention (Yokoyama, Sakai, Noguchi, & Kita, 




In contrast to Experiment 4, which compared congruent gaze-contingent 
displays with an incongruent condition, this experiment compared congruent with 
neutral displays, in which the gaze of the onscreen face remained static and 
unresponsive. Extrapolating from previous research, we predicted that this condition 
should provide a stronger contrast to the moving eye-gaze of the congruent condition, 
particularly when the stimulation face is not attended (see Burton et al., 2009; 
Yokoyama, et al., 2014). If it is possible to update the representation of the own face 







Twenty new Caucasian students (10 females) from the University of Kent, with 
a mean age of 21 years (SD = 5.1), participated in this study. All provided informed 
consent prior to taking part and received course credits or a small fee for participation. 
All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli and procedure  
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 4, except that the 
incongruent condition was replaced with neutral gaze displays. In this condition, the 
eye-gaze of the onscreen was always directed straight at the observers and 
unresponsive. As in Experiment 4, the self-other discrimination task was administered 
initially to obtain a baseline measure of self-recognition. Observers then performed 
two blocks, one for the congruent condition and one for the neutral condition, which 
comprised the stimulation phase, the self-other discrimination task, and the enfacement 
questionnaire. The order of these blocks was counterbalanced across observers. 
 
Results 
Self-other discrimination task 
Figure 15 illustrates performance in the discrimination task for the baseline 
condition and after the administration of the congruent and neutral displays. A one-
factor ANOVA (baseline, congruent, neutral condition) showed a main effect of 
condition, F(1,19) = 20.37, p   Șp2 = .51. Paired sample t-tests (Bonferroni-
corrected) show that observers perceived their own face earlier in the morphing 
sequence after the application of both the congruent and neutral conditions in 
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comparison with the baseline, t(19) = 6.68, p < .001 and t(19) = 4.51, p < .001, 
respectively. Discrimination performance in the congruent and neutral conditions did 
not differ, t(19) = 0.75, p = 1.00. 
 
Figure 15. Performance in the self-other discrimination task in Experiment 5, expressed as the number 
of frames that observers judged to show their own face or that of the onscreen face, for the baseline 
measure and after congruent and neutral stimulation. 
 
Enfacement questionnaire 
2EVHUYHUV¶ TXHVWLRQQDLUH UHVSRQVHV DUH VXPPDUL]HG LQ Figure 16. The 
difference in mean ratings for the verification items between the congruent and neutral 
condition demonstrates that observers were aware that the onscreen face followed their 
own eye-gaze (see items 8-10 in Figure 16), all ts(19)  6.55, ps < .001. In addition, 
ZKHQ DVNHG ZKHWKHU WKH RQVFUHHQ IDFH¶V H\HV PRYHG LQ D GLIIHUHQW GLUHFWLRQ WR
REVHUYHUV¶RZQLWHPUDWLQJVZHUHORZLQERWKFRQGLWLRQVDQGQRGLIIHUHQFHZDV





Figure 16. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the congruent (black bars) and the neutral 
(grey bars) conditions in Experiment 5. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
A comparison of the congruent and neutral condition also shows that the gaze-
contingent paradigm affected how observers felt about the stimulation face. Observers 
were more likely to report that this face looked like their own in the congruent than the 
neutral condition (items 1 and 2), both ts(19)  2.87, ps < .01, and also reported a closer 
resemblance between their own face and that of the onscreen face (items 5 and 6), both 
ts(19)  2.44, ps < .05. This effect was such that, if the eyes of the onscreen face had 
moved, they expected their own eyes to move too in the congruent condition (item 7), 
t(19) = 2.72, p < .05. However, an effect of condition was not universally found. 
Observers did not report that their own face felt out of control (item 4), t(19) = 0.19, p 
= .84, or, despite the clear convergence in felt resemblance between their own and the 
onscreen face, that they were looking at their own face in a mirror (item 3,) t(19) = 
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0.98, p = .33. Finally, an overall enfacement score was also calculated for each 
observer, by summing the scores for items 1 to 7. This enfacement score was higher in 
the congruent (M = 22.8, SD = 10.6) than the neutral condition (M = 16.9, SD = 8.4), 
t(19) = 3.24, p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
This experiment explored whether it is possible to update the representation of 
RQH¶Vown face with a gaze-contingent paradigm. In contrast to Experiment 4, this was 
investigated by comparing a congruent condition, in which the eye-gaze of an onscreen 
face follows that of the observer, with a neutral condition, in which the onscreen face 
was static and unresponsive. As in Experiment 4, observers were sensitive to the eye 
movements of the onscreen faces and their directionality in the congruent condition. 
However, a clearer contrast between conditions was now found, by replacing the 
incongruent with neutral gaze displays (c.f., items 8-10 in Figures 12 and 14). Once 
DJDLQKRZHYHUWKLVGLGQRWH[HUWDFOHDUHIIHFWRQREVHUYHUV¶VHOI-recognition in the 
discrimination task, which revealed identical effects for congruent and neutral 
stimulation displays in comparison to the initial measure at baseline. 
Despite the absence of an effect on self-recognition in the visual discrimination 
task, the gaze-FRQWLQJHQWSDUDGLJPDIIHFWHGREVHUYHUV¶UHSRUWVRIKRZWKH\IHOWDERXW
the onscreen and their own face. These reports revealed that observers felt that the 
RQVFUHHQIDFHµZDV¶WKHLURZQIDFHDQGµEHORQJHG¶WRWKHPDQGDOVRWKDWERWKIDFHV
began to resemble each other. This effect was such that, if the eyes of the onscreen face 
had moved, observers increasingly expected their own eyes to move too.  
These results indicate that this mirror-like gaze-contingent paradigm can affect 
how observers feel about their own faces. This finding converges with recent 
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enfacement experiments, in which similar effects are found when observers view the 
tactile stimulation of another agent while their own face is also stimulated (e.g., Maister 
et al., 2013; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a, 2012b; Tsakiris, 2008). However, in these 
studies a concurrent effect in the self-other discrimination task is typically also found 
(e.g., Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). 
A possible explanation for the absence of such an effect here might relate to 
the objects surrounding the target face, which acted as trigger-regions to change its 
gaze-direction and were required to elicit mirror-like responses. As a result of this 
manipulation, observers were actually drawn away from the onscreen face during 
stimulation. If this limits the encoding of the stimulation faces in our visual displays, 
by presenting these outside of foveal vision (see, e.g., Rousselet, Thorpe, & Fabre-
Thorpe, 2004; Rousselet, Husk, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2005), then this could eliminate 
WKHLQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHVWLPXODWLRQIDFHLQWRREVHUYHUV¶VHOI-representations. To address 
this limitation, we conducted a third experiment in which the eight boxes surrounding 
the onscreen face were replaced with the same face. The aim of this manipulation was 
to maximize encoding of this identity even when observers were not viewing the 
central stimulation face in the display directly. 
 
Experiment 6 
In this experiment, we sought to maximise the encoding of the face identity in 
the stimulation task. As in the preceding experiments, an unfamiliar face was placed 
in the centre of the scUHHQDQGUHVSRQGHGWRREVHUYHU¶VH\H-gaze. However, to increase 
the encoding of this identity, the eight surrounding boxes were replaced with copies of 
the same face. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, observers were therefore able to 




eye-gaze by copying the actions of the central face. This manipulation overcomes the 
potential limitations of Experiment 4, in which eye-gaze direction could be perceived 
only from the unattended central face. In the current experiment, this allowed us to 
revert to incongruent gaze displays, in which the onscreen gaze moves in temporal 
synchrony but a diIIHUHQWGLUHFWLRQWRREVHUYHUV¶RZQH\H-gaze.  
To introduce a task demand, after a two-minute stimulation period, one of the 
surrounding faces would close its eyes and observers were asked to detect this change. 
If it is possible to update self-representations with this gaze-contingent paradigm, then 
such an effect should be more likely under these conditions, which maximise encoding 




Twenty new Caucasian students (17 females) from the University of Kent, with 
a mean age of 22 years (SD = 8.5), participated in this study. All provided informed 
consent prior to taking part and received course credits or a small fee for participation. 
All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 4, except for the 
following changes. In the stimulation task, the eight boxes surrounding the central face, 
and the objects within, were now replaced by copies of the stimulation face (see Figure 
17). Each of these peripheral faces measured 160 by 210 pixels at a screen resolution 
of 72 ppi. In the congruent condition, the central face and each of these peripheral 
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copies mirror-PLPLFNHGREVHUYHUV¶H\H-gaze direction. In the incongruent condition, 
the eye-gaze direction of the central face and the peripheral copies was spatially 
LQFRQJUXHQWZLWKREVHUYHUV¶JD]H$IWHUDWZR-minute stimulation period, one of the 
surrounding faces closed it eyes. Observers were asked to scan the surrounding faces 
and to press <SPACE> as soon as they detected this change. 
 
 
Figure 17. Example stimuli for Experiment 3, showing direct and averted eye-gaze. 
 
Results 
Self-other discrimination task 
Figure 18 summarizes performance in the discrimination task for the baseline 
condition and after the administration of the congruent and incongruent stimulation 
displays. A one-factor ANOVA (baseline, congruent, incongruent) showed a main 
effect of condition, F(1,19) = 11.57, p   Șp2 = .38. Paired sample t-tests 
(Bonferroni-corrected) show that observers perceived their own face earlier in the 
discrimination sequence in the congruent condition compared to the baseline, t(19) = 
3.12, p < .05. However, a similar effect was observed in the incongruent condition, 
t(19) = 3.40, p < .05, and performance was indistinguishable when the congruent and 




Figure 18. Performance in the self-other discrimination task in Experiment 3, expressed as the number 
of frames that observers judged to show their own face or that of the onscreen face, for the baseline 
measure and after congruent and incongruent stimulation. 
 
Enfacement questionnaire 
The questionnaire responses indicate that observers were aware of the onscreen 
face following their own eye-gaze in the congruent compared to the incongruent 
condition (see items 8 and 9 in Figure 19), both ts(19)  2.19, ps < .05. Observers were 
also much more likeO\WRUHSRUWWKDWWKHWDUJHW¶VH\HVPRYHGLQWKHVDPHGLUHFWLRQDV
their own eyes in the congruent condition (item 10), t(19) = 7.13, p < .001, and in a 
different direction in the incongruent condition (item 11), t(19) = 6.66, p < .001. In 
addition, a direct comparison of the ratings for items 10 (eyes moved in the same 
direction) and 11 (eyes moved in a different direction) confirms that observers 
discriminated the directionality of the onscreen eye movements in both the congruent, 
t(19) = 12.15, p < .001, and incongruent condition, t(19) = 3.10, p < .001. 
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The gaze contingent paradigm also influenced how observers felt about the 
onscreen face. In the congruent compared to the incongruent condition, observers were 
more likely to report that the onscreen face looked like their own face (item 1), that it 
belonged to them (item 2), and that they felt they were looking at their own face in a 
mirror (item 3), all ts(19)  2.06, ps < .05. This effect was such that observers expected 
their own eyes to move too if the eyes of the target face had moved (item 7), t(19) = 
2.96, p < .01. 
 
Figure 19. Mean Likert responses to each enfacement item for the congruent (black bars) and 
incongruent (grey bars) conditions in Experiment 3. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p <.001. 
 
However, an effect of condition was not universally found. Despite the clear 
convergence in felt UHVHPEODQFHEHWZHHQREVHUYHUV¶RZQDQGWKHRQVFUHHQIDFHWKH\
did not report that these faces actually began to resemble each other (items 5 and 6), 
both ts(19)  1.65, ps >.07. In addition, observers also did not report that their own 
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face felt out of control (item 4), t(19) = .19, p = 1.67. Despite these similarities across 
FRQGLWLRQVREVHUYHUV¶RYHUDOOUDWLQJVZKLFKZDVFDOFXODWHGE\summing the scores for 
items 1 to 7, also revealed a higher enfacement score in the congruent (M = 25.5, SD 
= 9.1) than the incongruent condition (M = 19.7, SD = 8.8), t(19) = 3.42, p < .01. 
 
Discussion 
In this experiment, the objects surrounding the onscreen face during the 
stimulation phase were replaced with further images of this identity to maximize its 
HQFRGLQJ,QWKLVFRQWH[WREVHUYHUVZHUHFOHDUO\VHQVLWLYHWRWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH¶VH\H
movements in the congruent and incongruent conditions. As in Experiment 5, the gaze-
contingent stimulation paradigm also influenced how observers felt about the onscreen 
face, whereby they were more likely to report that it looked like their own face and 
that it belonged to them in the congruent than in the incongruent condition. This effect 
was sufficiently strong for observers to be more likely to report that they felt as if they 
were looking at their own face in a mirror in the congruent condition, and that their 
own eyes might move to mimic the actions of the onscreen face. Despite this impact 
RQREVHUYHUV¶UHSRUWVWKHJD]H-contingent task did not produce separable effects for 
the congruent and incongruent conditions in the discrimination task. This converges 




In the present chapter, a new paradigm to study how human observers might 
update mental representations of their own face has been presented. This paradigm 
VLPXODWHV WKH PLUURU UHIOHFWLRQ H[SHULHQFH E\ PLPLFNLQJ REVHUYHUV¶ H\H-gaze 
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behaviour with an onscreen face. In Experiment 4, observers were exposed to 
congruent stimulation, in which the movement of the onscreen face was synchronized 
with their own gaze behaviour, and an incongruent condition, in which the eyes of the 
RQVFUHHQIDFHPRYHGLQDGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWLRQWRREVHUYHUV¶H\H-gaze. This experiment 
GLGQRWUHYHDODQHIIHFWRIJD]HVWLPXODWLRQRQREVHUYHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHUHSRUWVRULQWKH
self-other discrimination task. The verification items of the questionnaire suggest that 
observers were sensitive to onscreen eye-gaze in the congruent condition only. By 
contrast, however, observers did not report a clear directionality for the onscreen facH¶V
eye movements in the incongruent condition. This suggests that they misperceived the 
GLUHFWLRQRIWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH¶VH\HPRYHPHQWVZKLFKPLJKWKDYHXQGHUPLQHGDQ\
stimulation effects of the gaze-contingent task. 
Subsequent experiments explored whether the gaze-contingent paradigm can 
be modified to elicit such effects. Experiment 5 replaced the incongruent condition 
with neutral displays, in which the onscreen eye-gaze was static and unresponsive, to 
provide a stronger contrast with congruent displays (see Burton et al., 2009; Yokoyama 
HWDO2EVHUYHUV¶VHOI-reports showed that they were sensitive to the difference 
in the eye movements between conditions, and also the mimicry that these eye-
movements exerted in the congruent condition. This was accompanied by a feeling that 
WKHRQVFUHHQ IDFHµZDV¶ WKHLURZQIDFHDQGµEHORQJHG¶ WR WKHPDQG WKDWERWKIDFHV
began to resemble each other. This effect was such that, if the eyes of the onscreen face 
had moved, observers would have expected their own eyes to move too. Once again, 
however, these changes were not accompanied by a corresponding effect in the self-




It is possible that the encoding of the onscreen face was limited in these 
experiments because observers were drawn from its location to the peripheral object-
triggers during the stimulation phase. A third experiment was conducted in which these 
peripheral objects were replaced with further photos of the onscreen face to promote 
further encoding of this identity. These additional face images also responded to 
REVHUYHUV¶ JD]H LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR IXUWKHU HQKDQFH WKLV PDQLSXODWLRQ ,Q FRQWUDVW WR
Experiment 4, observers were now clearly sensitive to gaze direction in both the 
congruent and incongruent condition. As in Experiment 5, this was accompanied by 
VWURQJHUUHSRUWVLQWKHFRQJUXHQWFRQGLWLRQWKDWWKHRQVFUHHQIDFHZDVREVHUYHUV¶RZQ
face than with incongruent displays, and that observers felt like they were looking at 
their own face in a mirror. Once again, however, the stimulation conditions did not 
affect the perceptual discrimination task. 
Taken together, these results indicate that our gaze-contingent mirror-
H[SHULHQFHSDUDGLJPFDQDOWHUREVHUYHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHUHSRUWVDERXWWKHLURZQIDFHE\
creating a higher µIHOW¶UHVHPEODQFHEHWZHHQWKHLUown face and an onscreen target in 
the congruent than in the neutral or incongruent conditions. At the same time, this 
VWLPXODWLRQZDVQRWHIIHFWLYHLQDOWHULQJREVHUYHUV¶SHUFHSWXDOVHOI-representations, as 
measured with the self-other discrimination task. A possible explanation for these 
GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ REVHUYHUV¶ VXEMHFWLYH UHSRUWV DQG WKHLU SHUFHSWXDO SHUIRUPDQFH 
could be that these reflect independent pathways in the cognitive face recognition 
system. One of these might be responsible for the perceptual recognition of a face, 
whereas the other provides an accompanying arousal response (see Ellis & Young, 
1990; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). This idea derives from the study of Capgras 
patients, who can identify familiar faces but do not exhibit the appropriate 
corresponding feelings of familiarity. As a consequence, these patients believe that 
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familiar people are replaced by impostors or aliens (Ellis, 1997). It is possible that our 
gaze-contingent paradigm exerts the reverse effect, by manipulating affective 
evaluations of the own face but not perceptual representations. 
This idea receives some support from explorations of the enfacement effect, 
where visuotactile stimulation mediates arousal responses to target faces (e.g., Bufalari 
et al., 2014; Fini et al., 2013; Maister et al., 2013; Paladino et al., 2010; Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2012a). However, it remains unresolved why perceptual processing was 
not affected as well in the current experiments. One possibility is that a stimulation 
phase of only two minutes is insufficient to manipulate self-representations that have 
been built up over twenty years in our participants. This explanation would be 
consistent with theories of face recognition, such as average-based accounts, in which 
different instances of the same face are integrated into a single representation (Burton, 
et al., 2005). Such averages appear to be remarkably resistant to contamination by other 
LGHQWLWLHV )RU H[DPSOH FKDQJHV WR WKH DYHUDJH RI D SHUVRQ¶V IDFH DSSHDU WR EH
imperceptible even when 20% of the source images are photographs of the wrong 
person (Jenkins & Burton, 2011). If this approach corresponds to the cognitive system 
for face recognition, then one would also expect internal facial representations to be 
immune to the brief perceptual stimulation that is applied in the experiments here. 
In future studies, this could be explored further by extending the stimulation 
phase or by applying this paradigm to developmental populations, in which self-
representations have been established for fewer years and facial appearance is 
undergoing more pronounced age-related changes. In such studies, the effect of mirror-
IHHGEDFNPLJKWDOVREHHQKDQFHGE\PLPLFNLQJPRUHWKDQREVHUYHUV¶H\H-gaze, such 
as facial expression and speech. By encompassing further facial information in this 
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way, the mirror-mimicry may exert more direct effects on visual encoding and the 
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Chapter 3 presented a new paradigm to study the process of updating the own 
face presentation. This gaze contingent paradigm simulates the mirror reflection 
H[SHULHQFH E\ PLPLFNLQJ REVHUYHUV¶ H\H-gaze behaviour with an onscreen face. 
However, although WKLV VWLPXODWLRQDOWHUHGREVHUYHUV¶ VXEMHFWLYH UHSRUWVDERXW WKHLU
RZQIDFH LWZDVQRWHIIHFWLYH LQDOWHULQJREVHUYHUV¶SHUFHSWXDO VHOI-representations. 
One question that arises refers to the cognitive locus of the processes of updating the 
own face representation. Chapter 4 explores this issue using ERPs.  
According to models of face processing (see Breen et al., 2001; Bruce & 
Young, 1986; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003), the enfacement might arise at three 
different loci. Firstly, it might arise at early perceptual processing stages (i.e., structural 
encoding). In support of this reasoning, an fMRI study has shown activation of the 
inferior occipital gyrus (IOG), a brain structure that has been linked to structural 
encoding of faces (see Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000), while observers 
experienced the enfacement illusion (Apps, Tajadura-Jiménez, Sereno, Blanke, & 
Tsakiris, 2015). In addition, there is experimental evidence that the lateral part of this 
structure, the occipital face area (OFA), is involved in the processing of individual 
facial features but not in the representation of the identity (see Barton, 2008; Kanwisher 
& Barton, 2011). 
Alternatively, the enfacement effect could also arise during later processing 
stages, such as a pre-semantic stage at which visual stimuli are matched to a stored 
LGHQWLW\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQLHD³)DFH5HFRJQLWLRQ8QLW´)58VHH%UHHQHWDO
Bruce & Young, 1986; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). Some evidence also supports 
this view. For example, psychometric approaches have shown that the main component 
of the enfacement illusion reflects the identification of the other face as own (Tajadura-
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Jiménez et al., 2012b). In addition, that the enfacement illusion affects performance in 
self-recognition tasks also suggests an identity locus in the process of updating the own 
face representation (e.g., Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008).  
Lastly, the enfacement effect could arise during the affective evaluation of the 
face (i.e., arousal response) that mediates recognition (see Breen et al., 2001; 
Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). Some research also supports this hypothesis. For 
example, familiar faces produce changes of autonomic physiological responses, such 
as electrodermal activity (see, e.g., Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1990). These changes 
are considered to reflect the mediation of an arousal emotional response to that face 
(Damasio et al., 1990; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). Interestingly, Tajadura-
Jiménez et al. (2012a) also showed that these physiological changes toward the enfaced 
face were higher during the synchronous than asynchronous multi-sensory facial 
stimulation. In addition, it has been found that the level of positive perception of the 
enfaced face is positively related to the strength of the enfacement illusion (Bufalari et 
al, 2014; see also, Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 2010). This suggests also that the 
enfacement illusion might depend on positive emotions toward the enfaced face.  
In the present study, we investigated directly which of these processes the 
enfacement illusion affects by using ERPs. This technique has been used widely to 
explore the time course and models of face processing (see, e.g., Eimer, 2011; 
Schweinberger, 2011). Given its high temporal resolution, ERPs are well suited to 
exploring the process by which representations of the own face are updated. Here we 
were specifically interested in three ERP components as potential correlates of the 
three purported cognitive loci of enfacement. The N170 is a negative deflection over 
occipito-temporal sites approximately 170 ms after stimulus onset. It is enhanced in 
response to faces compared to non-face objects (Bentin et al., 1996; Eimer, 2000, 2011) 
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and is considered to reflect early perceptual stages of face processing which precede 
identity recognition (Bruce & Young, 1986; Eimer, 2000, 2011). However, recent 
UHVHDUFKDOVRVXJJHVWVWKDWWKLVFRPSRQHQWLVPRGXODWHGE\³VHOI-LQIRUPDWLRQ´DVLWLV
more negative for the own face compared to familiar and unfamiliar faces (Caharel et 
al., 2002; Keyes et al., 2010, but see Sui et al., 2006; Tanaka et al., 2006).  
A subsequent component that has been more specifically linked to the 
activation of identity-specific representations for familiar faces is the N250 
(Kaufmann, Schweinberger, & Burton, 2009; Schweinberger et al., 2002; 
Schweinberger, 2011; Tanaka et al., 2006). This component consists of a negative 
deflection that peaks around 250 ms after the presentation of a known face at inferior-
temporal electrodes. This deflection is larger for familiar compared to unfamiliar faces 
and has therefore been related to the activation of stored facial identity representations 
(see Schweinberger, 2011). In addition, research has shown that this component is 
more negative for the own face compared to unfamiliar faces (Pierce et al., 2011; 
Tanaka et al., 2006). Tanaka et al. (2006) found, for example, that the N250 was 
enhanced for the own face compared to an unfamiliar target face in the first half of an 
experiment. However, in the second half of the experiment, the N250 was similar for 
both types of faces. This could suggest that the N250 reflects two different indexes of 
facial memory: one for pre-existing familiar face representations, such as the own face, 
and one for newly acquired face representations, such as the target face. Furthermore, 
the increase of N250 amplitude during experimental face familiarization is not 
restricted to the repetition of identical images, which indicates further that this 
component is related to person identification (Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
The P300 component is a positive deflection at centro-parietal sites, which 
peaks approximately 300 to 600 ms after stimulus onset. This component is considered 
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to be modulated by the arousal or emotional saliency of stimuli, as it is larger for 
stimuli with affective connotations (see, e.g., Carretié, Iglesias, Garcia, & Ballesteros, 
1997). This component is also larger for the own face compared to unfamiliar faces 
(Ninomiya et al., 1998). Some prosopagnosic patients also show a preserved P300 
response after the presentation of a familiar face (Bobes et al., 2004; see also Renault 
et al., 1989), which indicates that this component may also reflect covert face 
recognition (Bobes et al., 2004; see also Meijer, Smulders, Merckelbach, & Wolf, 
2007). 
The fact that the own face modulates ERP components in the early perceptual 
stages of the face processing (N170), the activation of facial identity (N250) and the 
emotional response to stimuli (P300) suggests that these components can be used to 




Experiment 7 explores the cognitive locus of the enfacement effect. In an initial 
stimulation stage, observers were exposed to blocks of synchronous and asynchronous 
stimulation. ERPs were then recorded during a subsequent face target detection task in 
which they were presented with pictures of their own face, the synchronously and 
asynchronously stimulated faces, two novel faces, and the target, which was the only 
face that required an overt response. We reasoned that if the process of enfacement 
affects the early perceptual encoding of the enfaced face, then N170 elicited by the 
own face should be similar to that of the synchronously but not the asynchronously 
stimulated face. If, on the other hand, enfacement causes the updating of identity 
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representations or emotional arousal response to the enfaced face, then these effects 




Twenty-eight Caucasian students (10 females) from the Friedrich Schiller 
University of Jena, with a mean age of 23 years (SD = 2.8), participated in this study. 
All provided informed consent, reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and 
received course credits or a small payment for participation. 
 
Stimuli 
To generate the stimuli for the multisensory stimulation stage, video footage of 
four Caucasian models (two males and two females) was recorded. In this footage, the 
models looked straight at the camera with a neutral expression while their left cheek 
was stroked with a cotton bud at two-second intervals for two minutes. An additional 
face photograph was taken of each model for the target detection task (see below). In 
the videos and the photographs, the models always wore a white EEG cap. 
Face photographs of six additional identities with a white EEG cap were also 
taken (three males and three females). In the experiment, these photographs were 
matched to the sex of each observer, with one of these serving as the target and the 
other two as novel faces. Finally, a photograph of each observer wearing a white EEG 
cap was also taken prior to the experiment for use in the own face condition. In total, 
observers therefore saw six face identities of the same sex: their own face (OF), a 
synchronously stimulated face (SF), an asynchronously stimulated face (AF), a target 
face (TF) and two novel faces (NV). The pictures measured approximately 350 (W) x 
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470 (H) pixels (~ 7 x 9 degrees of visual angle) at a screen resolution of 72 ppi and 
were presented on a black background. Examples are provided in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 20. Example photographs of male (left) and female (right) observers. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were seated at a distance of 100 cm from the screen, which was 
maintained with a chin-rest. Stimuli were displayed using E-primeTM 2.0.8.22 
3V\FKRORJ\6RIWZDUH7RROV,QF6KDUSVEXUJ3$RQD¶¶PRQLWRUZLWKDVFUHHQ
resolution of 768 (H) x 1024 (W) pixels. The experiment consisted of four blocks, 
comprising two blocks for the synchronous condition and two for the asynchronous 
condition. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across observers. Apart from the 
own face, which differed by definition across all participants, all female observers saw 
the same set of female faces across blocks, and all male observers saw the same set of 
male faces across blocks. However, within each participant sex, the allocation of faces 




Each block included two stimulation and two test phases. In each block (see 
Figure 21), observers first saw a two-minute video of a model being stroked with a 
cotton bud on the cheek. At the same time, participants were touched with an identical 
cotton bud on the specular congruent location in synchrony (synchronous condition) 
or in asynchrony (with a delay of one second) with the model (asynchronous 
VWLPXODWLRQ,PPHGLDWHO\DIWHUWKHYLGHRHQGHGWKHREVHUYHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH
during the stimulation stage was assessed with a German translation of the statement 
³, IHOW ,ZDV ORRNLQJDWP\RZQIDFH´³,FKKDWWHGDV*HIKOGDVVGDV9LGHRPHLQ
HLJHQHV*HVLFKW]HLJWH´7KLVVWDWHPHQWKDVEHHQXVHGUHSHDWHGO\LQSUHYLRXVZRUNWR
measure enfacement (e.g., Apps et al., 2015; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). 
Observers rated their level of agreement with this statement on a 7-point Likert scale, 
UDQJLQJIURP³VWURQJO\GLVDJUHH´WR³strongly agree´. 
After stimulation, participants were presented with the target face and a 
ILFWLWLRXV QDPH ³$QQD´ IRU IHPDOH WDUJHWV DQG ³+DQV´ IRU male targets) onscreen, 
which they were asked to memorize. During the recoding of EEG, they were then asked 
to monitor a sequence of faces and press <SPACE> as fast as possible every time the 
target face was presented. These experimental trials started with a fixation cross 
displayed for 500 ms, which was followed by a face for 1500 ms. Feedback was given 
if observers mistakenly responded to a non-WDUJHWIDFHHJ³7KLVZDVQRW$QQD´RU
ZKHQWKH\IDLOHGWRUHVSRQGWRWKHWDUJHWIDFHHJ³7KLVZDV$QQD´7KH)HHGEDFN
display was presented for 500 ms. No feedback was given for correct responses and 
correct omissions and a blank screen was presented for 500 ms instead. 
Each of the six different identities (OF, SF, AF, TF, and the two NF) was 
presented 30 times per block, giving a total of 180 trials. After 90 trials, observers were 
given a short break, after which the stimulation, rating and test phases were repeated 
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once. Therefore, each block consisted of a total of two stimulation, rating and test 
phases, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 21. Experimental block procedure.  
 
The structure of the second block was identical to the first block but observers 
received a different kind of stimulation (i.e., if observers had received synchronous 
stimulation in the first block, they received asynchronous stimulation in the second 
block and vice versa). The application of these conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants (i.e., SASA and ASAS). 
 
EEG/ERP methods  
EEG data were recorded with sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted in an 
HOHFWURGH FDS (DV\&DS +HUUVFKLQJ-Breitbrunn, Germany) using SynAmps 
amplifiers (NeuroScan Labs, Sterling, VA). Electrodes were arranged according to the 





outer canthi of both eyes. The vertical EOG was monitored bipolarly from electrodes 
above and below the right eye. Signals were assessed with AC (0.05±+]íG%




generated, lasting 1200 ms, including a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Only trials with 
correct responses were analysed. Trials contaminated by non-ocular artefacts were 
UHMHFWHG IURP IXUWKHU DQDO\VLV XVLQJ WKH %(6$ DUWHIDFW UHMHFWLRQ WRRO DPSOLWXGH
WKUHVKROGȝ9JUDGLHQWFULWHULRQȝ97ULDOVZHUHDYHUDJHGVHSDUDWHO\IRUHDFK
channel and experimental condition. Averaged ERPs were low-pass filtered at 20 Hz 
(zero phase shift), and recalculated to average reference, excluding vertical and 
horizontal EOG channels. ERPs were quantified using mean amplitudes for the 
occipito-temporal N170 (155 - 175 ms), the inferior-temporal N250 (250 - 360 ms), 
and the P300 (370 - 570 ms), all relative to a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Time-
windows for these components were selected in accordance with distinct peaks 
identified in the average of all condition grand mean waveform. Effects were 
quantified at electrodes of interest, which were selected based on the maxima of a 
particular component in the grand mean waveform and on previous research 
(Schweinberger et al., 2004; Schweinberger et al., 2002). Accordingly, N170 was 
assessed at P7, P8, P9, P10, PO9 and PO10, the N250 was captured at P7, P8, P9 and 





was analysed first, by averaging the ratings to the VWDWHPHQW³,IHOW,ZDVORRNLQJDWP\
RZQIDFH´for blocks with synchronous and asynchronous stimulation, respectively. As 
expected, these ratings were higher for the synchronous (mean = 2.53, SD = 1.32) than 
for the asynchronous condition (mean = 1.78, SD = 1.01), t(27) = 3.53, p < .01. This 
116 
 
indicates that participants perceived the other face as more similar to their own face in 
the synchronous compared to the asynchronous condition.  
 
Behavioural Results 
In the target detection task, accuracy was at ceiling level (over 99% correct 
across all conditions). Reaction times (RTs) were analysed for hits only, as responses 
were only required to the target face. When necessary in this and all subsequently 
reported ANOVAs, degrees of freedom were adjusted according to the Huynh-Feldt 
procedure. A 2 (stimulation: synchronous vs. asynchronous) x 2 (time: first half vs. 
second half of experiment) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. Observers 
were faster to respond to the target face in the asynchronous condition (median = 573 
ms, SD = 66 ms) than in the synchronous condition (median = 584 ms, SD = 67 ms), 
F(1,27) = 4.50, p Șp2 = .14. Responses were also faster in the second half of the 
experiment (median = 564 ms, SD = 71 ms) than the first (median = 595 ms, SD = 62 
ms), F(1,27) = 27.69, p Șp2 = .50. 
 
ERP Results 
ERP amplitudes were analysed with repeated-measures ANOVAs of the factors 
stimulation (synchronous vs. asynchronous), time (first half vs. second half of 
experiment) and face type (OF vs. SF vs. AF vs. TF vs. NF1). For the N170 and N250 
components, the factors hemisphere (left vs. right) and site (N170: P7/P8 vs. P9/P10 
vs. PO9/PO10; N250: P7/P8 vs. P9/P10) were also included, whereas the factor 
electrode (C3 vs. C4 vs. P3 vs. P4 vs. CZ vs. PZ) was included for the P300. For 
                                                          
1
 Although two different novel faces were included in the task, ERP data for both faces were combined 
into one level by averaging across both novel faces.   
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Results for the N170 component are summarized in Figures 21 and 22. 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of face type for the N170, F(4,108) = 15.06, p < .001, 
Șp2 = .358, which was qualified by a two-way interaction with hemisphere, F(4,108) = 
2.46, p Șp2 = .08. Subsequent separate ANVOAs for left and right hemispheric 
electrodes yielded main effects of face type over both hemispheres, with somewhat 
larger effects at left hemispheric sites, F(4,108) = 14.00, p   Șp2 = .34 and 
F(4,108) = 5.30, p Șp2 = .16, respectively. 
 
Figure 21. Grand-average ERPs for sites P9/P10 and PO9/PO10 illustrating the N170. 
 
The main effect of face type was also modified by site, as revealed by a two-
way interaction, F(8,216) = 3.05, p < Șp2 = .10. Separate ANOVAs for each site 
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revealed main effects of face type at P7/P8, F(4,108) = 4.30, p Șp2 = .13, P9/P10, 
F(4,108) = 12.69, p Șp2 = .32, and PO9/PO10, F(4,108) = 15.47, p Șp2 
= .36. Visual inspection suggests similar N170 amplitudes for SF and AF, and more 
negative amplitudes for OF (see Figure 21 and 22).  
 
Figure 22. N170 mean amplitudes for each face type in sites P7/P8, P9/P10 and PO9/PO10. 
 
This was confirmed by four planned pair-wise comparisons (LSD) between SF 
and the other face type conditions at each site. These tests revealed no significant 
differences between SF and AF at any of the three sites. In contrast, N170 amplitudes 
for SF were smaller than for OF at P9/P10 and PO9/PO10, both ps  Compared to 
TF and NF, N170 amplitudes for SF faces were also consistently larger at all three 
sites, all ps  (for an overview of these differences, see Table 3).  
In sum, these data show no evidence for reliable differences in N170 amplitudes 


























amplitudes were more negative for these two conditions compared to target and novel 
faces, but less negative compared to own-faces. 
 
 SF vs. AF SF vs. TF SF vs. NF SF vs. OF 
Left hemisphere p =  .94 p <  .001 p <  .001 p =  .31 
Right hemisphere p =  .34 p =  .03 p =  .05 p =  .07 
P7/P8 p =  .37 p =  .01 p =  .02 p =  .86 
P9/P10 p =  .74 p <  .01 p <  .001 p <  .01 
PO9/PO10 p =  .55 p <  .001 p <  .01 p =  .03 
Overall p = .42 p <  .001 p <  .01 p =  .04 
 
Table 3. Pair-wise Comparisons Between SF and the Other Conditions for the N170 Component 
 
N250 
For the N250, ANOVA showed a main effect of face type, F(4,108) = 34.99, p 
  Șp2 = .56. Visual inspection suggests the most prominent differences were 
between the OF and all other conditions (see Figure 21 and 23).  
 




















The main effect of face type was further qualified by two-way interactions with 
site, F(4,108) = 3.35, p Șp2 = .11, hemisphere, F(4,108) = 3.50, p Șp2 = 
.115, and time, F(4,108) = 9.56, p Șp2 = .26. These interactions were tested 
further with separate ANOVAs with repeated measurements of face type for each site, 
hemisphere, and time. A main effect of face type was present at P7/P8, F(4,108) = 
19.81, p Șp2 = .42, and P9/P10, F(4,108) = 32.14, p Șp2 = .54. The main 
effect of face type was also significant at left, F(4,108) = 19.86, p Șp2 = .42, 
and right hemispheric sites, F(4,108) = 25.76, p Șp2 = .48. Furthermore, a main 
effect of face type was found in the first half of the experiment, F(4,108) = 28.30, p  < 
Șp2 = .51, and the second half, F(4,108) = 32.99, p Șp2 = .55. As for the 
N170, main effects of face type were further tested by planned pair-wise comparisons 
(LSD), focusing on potential differences between SF and the other face type 
conditions. As can be seen in Table 4, none of the comparisons showed significant 
differences between the SF and the AF conditions. N250 amplitudes were overall 
largest for own-faces, with the TF approaching similar N250 amplitudes. 
In summary, these results show that the own face produced a larger N250 
compared to all other faces in the first part of the experiment. However, in the second 
half of the experiment the target faces evoked an N250 component that was similar in 
magnitude to that of the own face. This finding replicates previous studies (see Pierce 
et al., 2011; Tanaka et al., 2006). There was no evidence that synchronous and 






 SF vs. AF SF vs. TF SF vs. NF SF vs. OF 
P7/P8 p =  .56 p <  .001 p =  .16 p <  .001 
P9/P10 p =  .54 p <  .01 p =  .09 p <  .001 
Left hemisphere p =  .39 p <  .001 p =  .06 p <  .001 
Right hemisphere p =  .14 p <  .01 p =  .27 p <  .001 
First half p =  .71 p <  .01 p =  .15 p <  .001 
Second half p =  .36 p <  .001 p =  .07 p <  .001 
Overall p =  .50 p <  .001 p =  .09 p <  .001 
 




An ANOVA with repeated measurements on the factors electrode (C3 vs. C4 
vs. P3 vs. P4 vs. Cz vs. Pz), time (first half vs. second half), stimulation (synchronously 
vs. asynchronously) and face type (SF vs. AF vs. TF vs. NF vs. OF) revealed a main 
effect of face type, F(4,108) = 56.98, p Șp2 = .67, which was qualified by a two-
way interactions between face type and electrode, F(20,540) = 25.22, p Șp2 = 
 DQG IDFH W\SH DQG WLPH )    S   Șp2 = .51. Overall, P300 






Figure 24. Grand-average ERPs for electrodes C3, P3, CZ, PZ, C4 and P4 illustrating the P300. 
 
 The interaction of face type and electrode was followed up by separate 
ANOVAs for each electrode and, in the case of significant main effects of face type, 
by pair-wise comparisons (LSD) between SF and the other conditions. These analyses 
revealed effects of face type for each electrode, all Fs(4,ps ȘVp2 
EXWWKHUHZDVQRHYLGHQFHIRUVLJQLILFDQWDPSOLWXGHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ6)DQG
AF conditions. 
The interaction between face type and time was further investigated by two 
separate ANOVAs for the first and the second half of the experiment, respectively. An 
effect of face type was found for the first and second half of the experiment, F(4,108) 





Figure 25. P300 mean amplitudes for each face type in the first and the second half of the experiment. 
 
As with the N170 and N250, main effects of face type were investigated further 
with planned pair-wise comparisons (LSD), focusing on potential differences between 
SF and the other face type conditions. As can be seen in Table 5, none of these 
comparisons reveal significant differences between SF and AF faces. Visual inspection 
suggests that the interaction mainly stems from an increase of P300 amplitudes for 
target faces, in particular during the second half of the experiment (see Figure 25). In 
summary, these data therefore show that both the own face and the target face generally 































 SF vs. AF SF vs. TF SF vs. NF SF vs. OF 
C3 p =  .86 p =  .04 p =  .023 p <  .001 
C4 p =  .59 p <  .001 p <  .01 p <  .001 
P3 p =  .42 p <  .001 p <  .01 p <  .001 
P4 p =  .98 p <  .001 p <  .01 p <  .001 
CZ p = .91 p <  .010 p =  .021 p <  .001 
PZ p = .51 p <  .001 p <  .01 p <  .001 
First half p = .59 p <  .001 p =  .01 p <  .001 
Second half p =  .27 p <  .001 p =  .014 p <  .001 
Overall p =  .75 p <  .001 p <  .01 p <  .001 
 




This study measured ERPs to investigate whether the enfacement illusion arises 
during the early structural encoding stage of faces, a recognition stage at which facial 
stimuli are matched with stored representation, or during the affective evaluation of 
the face that mediates recognition. To explore these alternatives, the enfacement 
illusion was induced by stroking observers in synchrony or asynchrony with an 
unfamiliar onscUHHQIDFH$IWHUWKLVVWLPXODWLRQVWDJHREVHUYHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFH
of enfacement was assessed. Then, ERPs were recorded while observers performed a 
face target detection task. During this task, a synchronously and an asynchronously 
stimulated face, observers own face, and two unfamiliar novel faces were intermixed 
with the presentation of the target. 
In line with other studies (see, e.g., Apps et al., 2015; Maister et al., 2013; 




likely to report that the onscreen face felt like their own face after the synchronous 
condition. This indicates that enfacement was successfully induced. ERPs were then 
calculated for the target detection task. The N170 component, which is considered to 
be a marker of the early perceptual processing of faces (Eimer, 2000; 2011), showed 
no differences between synchronously and asynchronously stimulated faces. 
Compared to the target and new faces, N170 amplitudes for synchronously stimulated 
faces were consistently larger, but smaller than for the own face. This supports 
previous research in self-recognition, which has also demonstrated that the own face 
produces a larger N170 component (see Caharel et al., 2002; Keyes et al., 2010).  
The N250 component, which is considered to be a marker of the activation of 
facial identity (see Schweinberger, 2011), was also larger for the own face compared 
to all other faces. However, after training the target face elicited a comparable N250 
to that of the own face. This seems to indicate that the N250 not only reflects the 
activation of pre-experimentally familiar face activation, such as the own face, but that 
it is also sensitive to newly acquired facial representation (see Kaufmann et al., 2009; 
Pierce et al., 2011; Tanaka et al., 2006). This suggests that observers created and 
consolidated a representation of the target face during the course of the experiment. 
However, despite these changes, no differences were found between synchronously 
and asynchronously stimulated faces. 
Finally, the P300 component, which seems to mediate the emotional response 
for familiar faces (Bobes et al., 2004; Ninomiya et al., 1998), also demonstrated an 
enhanced response for the own faces compared to all other faces. Again, however, the 
amplitude of this component became more similar for the target and the own faces in 
the second half of the experiment. In addition, synchronously and asynchronously 
stimulated faces also evoked a larger P300 than novel faces. However, as with previous 
126 
 
components, no differences were found between the synchronously and 
asynchronously stimulated faces. Altogether, these results suggest that enfacement 
does not affect early perceptual ERP markers of face processing (N170), subsequent 
recognition stages (N250), or later affective evaluations of the face (P300). This is a 
striking finding considering that observers were more likely to report that the enfaced 
face was, in fact, their own after synchronous multisensory stimulation.  
Several reasons might explain the absence of ERP modulations between 
synchronously and asynchronously stimulated faces. Firstly, it is possible that the brief 
PXOWLVHQVRU\ VWLPXODWLRQ SHULRG LQ WKH FXUUHQW H[SHULPHQW PRGXODWHV REVHUYHUV¶
phenomenological illusion of owning the enfaced face but is unable to modulate 
perceptual, identity or emotional representations that have been built up over years. 
However, this contrast with extensive evidence showing that a short period (usually 
less than two minutes) of synchronous stimulation with other face is enough to 
modulate QRWRQO\WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQIDFHVHHHJ$SSVHWDO
Tajadura- Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008), but also social cognition processes 
VHHHJ0DLVWHUHWDO3DODGLQRHWDO)RUH[DPSOHZKHQREVHUYHUV¶
own face is stroked in synchrony with other face, they show a bias in self-recognition 
tasks whereby they tend to accept more aspects of that face as own (Tajadura- Jiménez 
et al., 2012a). This effect is such that it also affects more private aspect of the self (see 
Morin, 2006), such as emotion recognition (Maister et al., 2013) and conformity 
behaviour (Paladino et al., 2010).  
Alternatively, it is possible that synchronous stimulation can affect the 
representation of the own face, but this effect is short-lived and dependent on constant 
online stimulation. As a consequence, as no further stimulation was administered 




been measured. This would support previous research that has shown that body 
ownership depends on the concurrent detection of self-specifying intersensory 
correlations (see, e.g., Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Tsakiris, 2010). 
Accordingly, the role of synchronous multisensory stimulation is not simply to update 
the representation of the own face but also to keep it active (Tsakiris, 2010).  
In summary, in the current study observers consistently experienced a 
phenomenological enfacement illusion, but this did not modulate ERP components 
reflecting the early perceptual processing of faces (N170), the activation of facial 


















5.1 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis investigated the effect of multisensory stimulation of the face on 
physical and psychological aspects of the self. It has been classically assumed that the 
visual representation of the own face is stable (Miyakoshi et al., 2008; Porciello et al., 
2014). This implies that people recognize their own face by matching the visual input 
with a stable and view-invariant representation that they have stored of their own face 
(Bruce, 1982; Bruce & Young, 1986). This position has been challenged by recent 
research, which suggests that the representation of the own face is not static but flexible 
and constantly updated. This research shows, for example, that wheQDQREVHUYHU¶V
own face is stroked on the cheek in synchrony with another face, they tend to see that 
face as more similar to their own (see e.g., Paladino et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et 
al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008; Sforza et al., 2010). This perceptual effect is accompanied 
by a phenomenological experience that the other face belongs to the observer, and is 
absent when this stimulation is administered in asynchrony (i.e., with a short delay). 
This indicates that synchronous, but not asynchronous, multisensory stimulation 
supports the updating of the cognitive representations of the own face.  
The enfacement illusion is not only informative about the characteristics of 
cognitive representations of the own face, but also provides insight into social 
cognition. For example, after SMS of the own-face with the face of an unfamiliar other, 
observers report more positive affective reactions and more conformity behaviour 
toward the unfamiliar person, than after asynchronous stimulation (Paladino et al., 
2010). This modulation of socio-cognitive processes is also seen toward outgroup 
members. For example, after the enfacement of a black face, observers show an 
increase of the visual remapping of touch effect (i.e. the increased tactile sensitivity in 
observers when viewing another face being touched; see Cardini et al., 2012; Marcoux 
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et al., 2013). This effect seems to be bigger in observers who initially have a stronger 
implicit bias against the outgroup members (Fini et al., 2013). Altogether, these 
findings suggests that SMS blurs self-other boundaries not only with regard to physical 
appearance but also in a more social sense, by reducing the differences between the 
self and an enfaced face. In turn, the enfaced face appears to become incorporated into 
the self-space (Paladino et al., 2010; Schubert, & Otten, 2002), thus producing an 
overlapping of the mental representation of both faces (see Tsakiris, 2010).  
Interestingly, other tasks, such as behavioural mimicry, intergroup contact and 
shared attributes generation, are also based on self-other boundaries blurring and have 
been employed to decrease prejudice toward outgroup members (see Crips & Turner, 
2009; Davis et al., 1996; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hall et al., 2009; Inzlicht et al., 
2006; Turner et al., 2007). Chapter 2 therefore investigated whether SMS of the face, 
similar to these tasks, also modulates racial prejudice. For this purpose, Caucasian 
observers were stroked on the cheek with a cotton bud in synchrony with a black face 
in Experiment 1. This was compared with a neutral condition, in which no tactile 
stimulation was administered during exposure to a black face. The impact of these 
PDQLSXODWLRQVRQREVHUYHUV¶SKHQRPHQRORJLFDOH[SHULHQFHRIWKHRQVFUHHQIDFHZDV
then assessed with an established enfacement questionnaire (see Tajadura-Jiménez et 
al., 2012a; Maister et al., 2013b). In addition, racial prejudice was measured implicitly 
with the name-UDFH,$7VHH+DOOHWDODQGH[SOLFLWO\ZLWK/HSRUHDQG%URZQ¶V
(1997) subtle racial prejudice scale. In this experiment, observers experienced a 
consistent enfacement illusion after synchronous stimulation, whereby they reported 
to embody the black face. However, these changes in their phenomenological 
experience were not accompanied by a modulation of racial prejudice. 
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 Recent research has questioned the validity of the name-race IAT that was 
employed to measure racial prejudice in Experiment 1, as the preference toward white 
names in this test could reflect a simple familiarity effect (see van Ravenzwaaij, et al., 
2011). To rule out this possibility, Experiment 2 used a face-race IAT (Dasgupta et al., 
2000), in which the black- and white-associated names from Experiment 1 were 
replaced with black and white faces. This IAT therefore cannot be undermined by a 
lack of familiarity with the race stimuli (van Ravenzwaaij et al., 2011). As in 
Experiment 1, observers experienced a stronger enfacement illusion after the 
synchronous condition in Experiment 2. However, despite the changes to the IAT, 
SMS did not produce concurrent changes in racial prejudice. 
Experiment 3 modified the stimulation paradigm and the IAT in a further 
attempt to increase the sensitivity. In the stimulation task, the neutral condition was 
replaced with an asynchronous stimulation condition, which is the classical 
comparison condition in the enfacement paradigm (see, e.g., Tajadura-Jiménez, et al., 
2012a; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). In this condition, observers receive the same tactile 
stimulation as in the synchronous condition, but this is administered with a one-second 
delay to the observed stimulation of the onscreen face. This asynchronous condition 
therefore imposes a temporal incongruence between what observers feel when they are 
touched and the touch that they see applied to the onscreen model. In addition, the IAT 
was also replaced with a single-category version, which does not contrast attitudes to 
an ingroup with an outgroup, but measures attitudes toward the outgroup only 
(Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). For this reason, the single-category IAT is considered 
DPRUHGLUHFWPHDVXUHRIREVHUYHUV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGEODFNSHRSOHVHH.DUSLQVNL	
Steinman, 2006; Maister et al., 2013a). In a further change to the preceding 
experiments, observers were only exposed to one of the stimulation conditions (i.e., 
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synchronous or asynchronous). To determine whether any change in racial prejudice 
occurred as a consequence of SMS of the face, they therefore performed the single-
category IAT twice, prior to and after stimulation stage. As in previous experiments, 
observers reported a stronger subjective enfacement illusion in the synchronous 
condition. Once again, however, SMS did not modulate racial prejudice.  
In summary, the experiments reported in Chapter 2 show that it is possible to 
embody a face, even when it belongs to a difference ethnic group. However, this 
change in the onscreen face ownership experience was not accompanied by a 
modulation of racial prejudice. These findings converge with previous research, by 
showing that it is possible to embody physical features of an outgroup member, such 
as a black hand (Maister et al., 2013a) or black faces (Fini et al., 2013; Bufalari et al., 
2014). In contrast to previous work, however, a positive effect of SMS of the face on 
prejudice reduction was not found. For example, recent research has shown that the 
LQWHQVLW\OHYHORIREVHUYHUV¶ LOOXVLRQRIRZQHUVKLSRYHUDEODFNKDQGUHODWHVWR WKHLU
racial prejudice (see Maister et al., 2013a). These differences could be explained by 
faces being more difficult to embody than hands. In support of this notion, 
phenomenological evidence suggests that the enfacement illusion is less vivid than 
both the rubber hand and the full-body illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Sforza et al., 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Despite the absence of an effect of SMS on racial prejudice, a clear enfacement 
effect was obtained in all experiments in Chapter 2. This converges with previous 
research to suggest that SMS of the face is a remarkably robust effect in self-face 
recognition (e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). 
However, the enfacement paradigm relies on observing the tactile stimulation of 
another person, which is a scenario that is not encountered outside of the laboratory. 
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&KDSWHU  WKHUHIRUH H[DPLQHG ZKHWKHU D VLPLODU XSGDWLQJ RI REVHUYHUV¶ IDFLDO
representations occurs with a stimulation method that is more similar to the experience 
RIVWXG\LQJRQH¶VRZQUHIOHFWLRQLQDPLUURU)RUWKLVSXUSRVHDQRYHOJD]e-contingent 
paradigm was developed. In this paradigm, the eye movements of a face on a computer 
screen directly mimic the looking behaviour of the observer. To measure the effect of 
this mirror-like stimulation in self-recognition, established measures of the enfacement 
illusion from multi-sensory stimulation paradigms were adopted (see, e.g., Keenan et 
al., 1999; Maister et al., 2013b; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008). This 
comprised a self-other discrimination task, in which observers were shown a morphing 
VHTXHQFHEHWZHHQWKHIDFHYLHZHGLQWKHVWLPXODWLRQVWDJHDQGREVHUYHUV¶RZQIDFH,Q
this task, observers were asked to determine at which point they could perceive their 
own face in the sequence. This measure was complemented with an adapted version of 
the enfacement questionnaire from the previous Chapter. 
In Experiment 4, observers were exposed to congruent stimulation, in which 
the movement of the onscreen face was synchronized with their own gaze behaviour, 
and an incongruent condition, in which the eyes of the onscreen face moved in a 
different direction to their own eyes. This experiment did not reveal an effect of gaze 
stimulation on the self-RWKHUGLVFULPLQDWLRQWDVNRUREVHUYHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHUHSRUWV7KH
verification items of the questionnaire suggest that observers were sensitive to the 
onscreen eye-gaze in the congruent condition only. By contrast, however, they did not 
UHSRUWDFOHDUGLUHFWLRQDOLW\IRUWKHRQVFUHHQIDFH¶VH\HPRYHPHQWVLQWKHLQFRQJUXHQW





Subsequent experiments explored whether the gaze-contingent paradigm can 
be modified to elicit such effects. Experiment 5 replaced the incongruent condition 
with neutral displays, in which the onscreen eye-gaze was static and unresponsive, to 
provide a stronger contrast with congruent displays (see Burton et al., 2009; Yokoyama 
et al., 2014). ObserYHUV¶VHOI-reports showed that they were sensitive to the difference 
in eye movements between conditions, and also the mimicry that these eye-movements 
exerted in the congruent condition. In addition, observers experienced a consistent 
enfacement-like illusion after the stimulation of the congruent condition, whereby they 
reported to embody the onscreen face. Once again, however, these changes were not 
accompanied by a corresponding effect in the self-other discrimination task. This 
indicates that the gaze-FRQWLQJHQW WDVN GLG QRW PRGLI\ REVHUYHUV¶ SHUFHSWXDO
representations of the own face. 
It is possible that the encoding of the onscreen face was limited in these 
experiments because observers were drawn from its location to the peripheral object-
triggers during the stimulation phase. To avoid this, Experiment 6 replaced these 
peripheral objects with further photos of the onscreen face to promote further encoding 
RIWKLVLGHQWLW\7KHVHDGGLWLRQDOIDFHLPDJHVDOVRUHVSRQGHGWRREVHUYHUV¶JD]HLQDQ
attempt to further enhance this manipulation. In contrast to Experiment 4, observers 
were now clearly sensitive to gaze direction in both the congruent and the incongruent 
condition. This was accompanied by stronger reports of an enfacement-like illusion in 
the congruent condition than with incongruent displays. Once again, however, the 
stimulation conditions did not affect the perceptual discrimination task. 
Taken together, the results of Chapter 3 indicate that the gaze-contingent 





measured with the self-other discrimination task. A possible explanation for the 
GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ REVHUYHUV¶ VXEMHFWLYH UHSRUWV DQG WKHLU SHUFHSWXDO SHUIRUPDQFH
could be that these reflect independent pathways in the cognitive face recognition 
system. One of these might be responsible for the perceptual recognition of a face, 
whereas the other provides an accompanying arousal response (see Ellis & Young, 
1990; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). This idea derives from the study of Capgras 
patients, who can identify familiar faces but do not exhibit the appropriate 
corresponding feelings of familiarity. As a consequence, these patients believe that 
familiar people are replaced by impostors or aliens (Ellis, 1997). It is possible that the 
gaze-contingent paradigm of Chapter 3 exerts the reverse effect, by manipulating 
affective evaluations of the own face but not perceptual representations.  
The final experimental chapter investigated the locus of the enfacement 
illusion. Previous research suggests that the locus of this effect could be in early 
processing perceptual stages, such as the structural encoding of a face (see Bruce & 
Young, 1986). This is borne out of the finding that the inferior occipital gyrus, which 
has been linked to the structural encoding of faces (see Haxby et al., 2000), is activated 
during the enfacement illusion (Apps et al., 2015). Experimental evidence has also 
shown that the lateral part of this structure (i.e., the occipital face area) is involved in 
the processing of individual facial features but not in the representation of identity (see 
Barton, 2008; Kanwisher, & Barton, 2011). 
Alternatively, the enfacement effect could also arise during later processing 
stages, such as the pre-semantic matching of visual stimuli to a stored representation 
of identity (e.g., an FRU, see, e.g., Breen et al., 2001; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). 
Some evidence also supports this view. For example, psychometric approaches have 
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shown that the main component of the enfacement illusion reflects the identification 
of the other face as the own (Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b). In addition, the fact that 
the enfacement illusion affects performance in self-recognition tasks also suggest an 
identity locus, based on the process of updating representations of the own face (e.g., 
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tsakiris, 2008).  
Lastly, the enfacement effect could arise during the affective evaluation of the 
face (i.e., arousal response) that mediates recognition (see, e.g., Breen et al., 2001; 
Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). Some research also supports this hypothesis. For 
example, Tajadura-Jiménez et al. (2012) showed that electrodermal activity toward the 
enfaced face is higher during synchronous than asynchronous stimulation. This 
electrodermal activity seems to reflect the mediation of an arousal emotional response 
to faces (see Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). Additionally, Bufalari et al. (2014) 
found that the more positively perceived the enfaced face was, the stronger the 
enfacement illusion was, which suggests that this illusion might be dependent on 
positive emotions toward the enfaced face (see also Paladino et al., 2010; Sforza et al., 
2010). 
The fact that the own face modulates ERP components in the early perceptual 
stages of face processing (i.e., the N170 component; Keyes et al., 2010), during the 
activation of facial identity (i.e., the N250 component; Tanaka et al., 2006), and the 
emotional response to stimuli (i.e., the P300 component; Ninomiya et al., 1998) 
suggests that these components can be used to explore the cognitive locus of the 
enfacement illusion. This issue was investigated in Experiment 7 in Chapter 4. In an 
initial stimulation stage, observers were exposed to blocks of synchronous and 
asynchronous stimulation. After each stimulation block, ERPs were recorded while 
observers performed a face target detection task in which they were presented with 
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pictures of their own face, the synchronously stimulated face, the asynchronously 
stimulated face, new faces, or a target face. Observers were instructed to respond only 
to the target face.  
As in previous experiments, observers reported that they felt like they were 
looking at their own face during synchronous stimulation, which indicates that the 
enfacement illusion was successfully induced. In the analysis of the ERPs, the N170, 
which is considered to be a marker of early perceptual processing stages (Eimer, 2000; 
2011), was more negative for the own face compared to all other faces, which supports 
previous research in self-recognition (see Caharel et al., 2002; Keyes et al., 2010). 
Additionally, N170 amplitudes were more negative for the synchronously and 
asynchronously stimulated faces compared to the new and the target faces. Taken 
together, these results suggest that the early perceptual processing of the own face is 
enhanced, whereas enfacement does not affect this processing stage.  
The ERPs also showed a larger N250 for the own face compared with all other 
faces. However, after extensive training, the target face also elicited a N250 response 
that was identical to that of the own face. This indicates that observers created and 
consolidated a representation of the target face during the course of the experiment. 
This suggests that the N250 not only reflects the activation of pre-experimentally 
familiar faces, such as the own face, but also that it is sensitive to newly acquired facial 
representations. However, despite these effects, no differences were found between the 
synchronously and asynchronously stimulated face in this component. Similarly, the 
P300 component, which seems to mediate the emotional response to familiar faces 
(Bobes et al., 2004; Ninomiya et al., 1998), showed a stronger effect to both the own 
face and the target face than all other faces. However, no difference was found between 
the synchronously and asynchronously stimulated faces for this component. 
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Altogether, the results of Experiment 7 suggest that enfacement does not affect the 
early perceptual processing of faces (i.e., the N170 component), later recognition 
stages (i.e., the N250 component) or the affective evaluation of the face that mediates 
the recognition (i.e. the P300 component). 
 
5.2 Theoretical implications  
The findings of this thesis have clear theoretical implications for accounts of 
identity and self-face recognition. Foremost, these studies show that the representation 
of the own face is malleable as a consequence of sensory input. This is such that when 
observers are stroked in synchrony with other face, they have the feeling that the other 
face is, in fact, their own. Interestingly, as shown in Chapter 2, this effect occurs even 
when the observer and the model belong to different ethnic groups. These findings 
suggests that SMS of the face blurs self-other boundaries by reducing the differences 
between the self and an enfaced face (Paladino et al., 2010; Schubert, & Otten, 2002; 
Tsakiris, 2010).  
This phenomenon is striking as the race does not only play an important role in 
self-identity (Lepore & Brown, 1997) but also people belonging to different ethnic 
groups (i.e., white Caucasian and Black people) have distinctive facial features. 
However, the phenomenological experience of embodying a black face did not produce 
concurrent modulation of racial prejudice. This contrasts with other tasks, such as 
behavioural mimicry and intergroup contact, which are also based on the reduction of 
self-other differences but have been employed to decrease prejudice toward outgroup 
members (see Crips & Turner, 2009; Davis et al., 1996; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 
Inzlicht et al., 2012; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Turner et al., 2007). It is possible that 
the mechanism involved in these tasks is different to that involved in the enfacement 
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illusion. In the enfacement illusion, observers tend to perceive the onscreen face as 
more similar to their own, but not the opposite (see Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a). In 
contrast, in other manipulations, such as behavioural mimicry (Inzlicht et al., 2012), 
shared attribute generation (Hall et al., 2009), or intergroup contact (Tuner & Crisp, 
REVHUYHUVPXVWWDNHWKHPRGHO¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDQGVKRXOGWKHUHIRUH³ORRN´PRUH
like the model. The findings of Chapter 2 also suggest that such perspective-taking 
might be important for prejudice reduction. 
The classical enfacement paradigm relies on observing the tactile stimulation 
of another person, which is a scenario that is not encountered outside of the laboratory. 
Interestingly, a similar phenomenological experience of embodying was obtained in 
Chapter 3, with a new paradigm which is more similar to the experience of studying 
RQH¶VRZQUHIOHFWLRQLQDPLUURU7KLVJD]HFRQWLQJHQWSDUDGLJPsimulates the mirror 
UHIOHFWLRQH[SHULHQFHE\PLPLFNLQJREVHUYHUV¶H\H-gaze behaviour with an onscreen 
face. However, and despite WKDWWKLVVWLPXODWLRQDOWHUHGREVHUYHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHUHSRUWV
DERXW WKHLU RZQ IDFH LW ZDV QRW HIIHFWLYH LQ DOWHULQJ REVHUYHUV¶ SHUFHSWXDO VHOI-
representations. 
$ SRVVLEOH H[SODQDWLRQ IRU WKHVH GLIIHUHQFHV EHWZHHQ REVHUYHUV¶ VXEMHFWLYH
reports and their perceptual performance could be that these reflect independent 
pathways in the cognitive face recognition system. One of these might be responsible 
for the perceptual recognition of a face, whereas the other provides an accompanying 
arousal response (see Ellis & Young, 1990; Schweinberger & Burton, 2003). This idea 
derives from the study of Capgras patients, who can identify familiar faces but do not 
exhibit the appropriate corresponding feelings of familiarity. As a consequence, these 
patients believe that familiar people are replaced by impostors or aliens (Ellis, 1997). 
It is possible that the gaze-contingent paradigm of Chapter 3 exerts the reverse effect, 
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by manipulating affective evaluations of the own face but not perceptual 
representations.  
Chapter 4 investigated this issue in detail using ERPs. In spite of the clear 
phenomenological effect of embodying the other face when comparing the 
synchronous and the asynchronous condition, the enfacement did not affect the early 
perceptual processing of faces (i.e., the N170 component), later recognition stages (i.e., 
the N250 component) or the affective evaluation of the face that mediates the 
recognition (i.e. the P300 component). This contrasts with previous evidence showing 
that the enfacement effect might have a perceptual (Apps et al., 2015), identity 
(Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b; Tsakiris, 2008) or 
emotional (Bufalari et al, 2014; Paladino et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a) 
locus 
It is possible that synchronous stimulation can affect the representation of the 
own face, but this effect is short-lived and dependent of constant online stimulation. 
To avoid noise distortion in ERPs, EEG recording requires long test periods (Luck, 
2014), so as no further stimulation was administered during this recording stage, any 
FKDQJHVWRWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIREVHUYHUV¶RZQIDFHVPLJKWKDYHGHFD\HGEHIRUHWKHVH
could have been measured. This would support previous research that has shown that 
body ownership depends on the concurrent detection of self-specifying intersensory 
correlations (see, e.g., Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris, 2010). Accordingly, the role of 
SMS is not simply to update the representation of the own face but also to keep it active 
(Tsakiris, 2010).  
This last point would have important consequences when models of face 
learning (e.g., Burton et al., 2005) are extended to self-face learning. The own face, 
like other faces, can exhibit considerable variability in appearance due to changes of 
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the pose, grooming, aging, and so forth. Our cognitive system has to deal with these 
changes in order to maintain recognition accuracy. Recent models of face learning 
suggest that one way to deal with such changes is through facial averages (e.g., Burton 
et al., 2005). According to these models, different instances of the own face might be 
integrated into a single representation, which would contain the information that is 
relevant exclusively for recognition. By contrast, variable visual information that is not 
relevant for this task would be eliminated during averaging because the effect of this 
³QRLVH´LVFDQFHOOHGRXWDFURVVGLIIHUHQWLQVWDQFHV%XUWRQHWDO+RZHYHUWKHVH
theories stop short of explaining the self-referential process of knowing that a 
paUWLFXODU IDFH LV LQ IDFW RQH¶V RZQ HJ 'HYXH 	 %UHGDUW  0RULQ 
Understanding the effect of SMS of the face could fill this gap in current theorizing, as 
the representations of our face are held to be created and updated through the 
interaction and integration of different senses, such as visual, tactile and proprioceptive 
information (Blanke et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). While the current 
experiments begin to explore this process, the results stop short of providing a 
convincing explanation. 
Despite a persistent phenomenological enfacement illusion after synchronous 
(Chapters 2 and 4) and congruent gaze stimulation (Chapter 3) in relative terms (i.e., 
when compared with their respective control conditions), this effect was small in 
absolute terms LHREVHUYHUV¶UHVSRQVHVfor the synchronous or congruent conditions 
were below the mid-point of the questionnaire). This is consistent with other face 
embodiment studies (e.g., Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012a; 
Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012b) and contrasts with the phenomenological experience 
reported in the rubber hand illusion (e.g., Longo et al., 2008), which is greater not only 
in relative terms, but also in absolute terms. It has been proposed that these differences 
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show that the enfacement illusion is less vivid than other body illusions (see Sforza et 
al., 2010).  
 
5.3 Limitations and future research  
 Body ownership has been investigated mainly with the rubber hand paradigm 
(Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In general, this research has shown that a hand is 
embodied with relative ease (for review, see Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Although 
faces are also susceptible to rubber-hand like illusions, this effect seems to be subtler 
(see Sforza et al., 2010). This is not surprising as the face is our most distinctive feature 
and is strongly tied to our identity (McNeill, 1988). However, these differences 
between the rubber-hand and the enfacement illusion have only been addressed 
indirectly, by comparing different published studies (see Sforza et al., 2010). Future 
research should, therefore, directly compare the differences between the embodiment 
of a hand and a face in a within-subjects design.  
The effect of each illusion could be measured at a phenomenological level by 
using questionnaires. However, as such information is based on explicit verbal report, 
it can be limited and biased. On the other hand, it could be difficult to compare the 
effect of these illusions at a behavioural level, as this would require the adaptation of 
behavioural rubber-hand effect measures for the measurement of enfacement 
paradigm, and vice versa. One objective and useful measure to compare the effects of 
the rubber hand and the enfacement illusion could be the use of physiological 
responses, such as electrodermal activity (EDA). For example, recent research has 
shown that EDA is an index of the strength of the rubber hand illusion (see Braithwaite, 
Broglia, & Watson, 2014). Comparing the EDA activity of the rubber hand illusion 
and the enfacement would help to elucidate not only which illusion produces a stronger 
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sense of ownership, but also which has an earlier onset. Answering these questions 
would help to further understand the importance of different body parts in the 
representation of the self.  
The enfacement illusion has been obtained by the combination of vision and 
touch. Another interesting question that arises is whether it is possible to obtain an 
enfacement illusion with alternative sensory modalities. Research in the rubber hand 
illusion has shown that it is possible to embody a hand with no tactile stimulation, 
when only the movement of the rubber hand and the own hand are congruent (e.g., 
Dummer et al., 2009; Riemer et al., 2014). This seems to indicate that the sense of 
body ownership is not specific to the multisensory integration of vision and tactile 
information, but to the detection of self-specifying intersensory correlations (see 
Ehrsson et al., 2005; Dummer et al., 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  
Chapter 2 tried to extend these results by trying to obtain an enfacement-like 
effect with a completely novel paradigm in which no tactile stimulation is involved. 
Instead, in this gaze-contingent paradigm the eye-gaze direction of an unfamiliar face 
on a computHUVFUHHQIROORZVREVHUYHUV¶H\H-gaze, in a mirror-like way. However, in 
contrast with the classical enfacement paradigm, this manipulation did not alter 
REVHUYHUV¶SHUFHSWXDOVHOI-representations. One possible explanation is that to get an 
enfacement effect it is necessary to reach a minimum sensory threshold level (see Stein 
& Meredith, 1993). In contrast with the classical enfacement paradigm, the gaze-
contingent paradigm therefore might not provide sufficient sensory input to reach such 
a minimum threshold level. This situation could occur because eye-gaze direction 
cannot be perceived easily outside the focus of attention (Burton et al., 2009). If the 
enfacement illusion, and other bodily illusions, depend on the amount of sensory 
stimulation received, then increasing the amount of sensory input would produce a 
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stronger sense of ownership. This issue could be investigated by increasing the amount 
of input delivered into the same sensory modality (e.g., one cotton bud stroking each 
side of the face) or by combining different paradigms that tap into different sensory 
modalities (e.g., the classical enfacement paradigm with a gaze-contingent mirror 
paradigm). 
Finally, one of the aims of science is, of course, to extent laboratory findings 
to applied contexts. In the case of psychological sciences, one of these contexts is the 
clinical and mental health practice. Neuropsychological therapy based on SMS has 
already been applied successfully to phantom limb disorders after amputations (see, 
e.g., Ramachandran & Hauser, 2010). In addition, some recent evidence suggests that 
this kind of therapy can be used to treat somatotopagnosia, which is the inability to 
recognize a part of one's body as one's own (see, e.g., Buxbaum & Branch-Coslett, 
2001). It is also possible that mirrored self-misidentification, which is a 
neuropsychiatric disorder that consists of WKH EHOLHI WKDW RQH¶V RZQ PLUURU LPDJH
reflects another person (Breen et al., 2000, 2001; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005; Van den 
Stock et al., 2012), could benefit from SMS of the face. The extra stimulation that this 
method provides could help to make patients aware that the face reflected in the mirror 
is, in fact, their own. Research programmes in the field of neuropsychology of mirrored 
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The subtle prejudice questionnaire (Lepore & Brown, 1997). 
 
1. It makes sense for minority groups to live in their own neighbourhood because 
they share more and get along better than when mixing with whites. 
2. I consider our society to be unfair to black people. 
3. It should be easier to acquire British citizenship. 
4. The number of black members of parliament is too low and political parties 
should take active steps to increase it. 
5. Minority groups are more likely to make progress in future by being patient 
and not pushing so hard for change. 
6. Given the present high level of unemployment, foreigners should go back to 
their countries.  
7. The right of the immigrants should be restricted (1), left as they are (4), 
extended (7). 
8. If many black persons moved to my neighbourhood in a short period of time, 
thus changing its ethnic composition, it would not bother me. 
9. If people move to another country, they should be allowed to maintain their 
own traditions. 
10. Once minority groups start getting jobs because of their colour, the result is 
bound to be fewer jobs for whites. 
11. Those immigrants who do not have immigration documents should be sent back 
to their countries. 
12. Some black people living here who receive support from the state could get 
along without it if they tried. 
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13. Suppose that a child of yours had a child with a person of very different colour 
and physical characteristics than your own. If your grandchildren did not 
physically resemble the people on your side of the family, you would be very 
bothered (1), not bothered at all (7). 
14. It is unfair to the people of one country if the immigrants take jobs and 
resources. 
15. I would not be concerned if most of my peers at the university were black. 
